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I. Developments in Argentina
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On March 9, 2006, a bill amending Section 1 of Antitrust Law No. 25.156 was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives., The bill proposes amending the law to cover not
only practices injuring consumers, but also conduct affecting economic interests of com-
petitors. Also in March 2006, a bill creating an antitrust prosecutor position was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives.2
B. MERGERS
On August 29, 2006, the Secretary of Domestic Trade, relying on the opinion of the
Antitrust Commission (Commission), conditionally approved Arcor S.A.'s purchase of 100
percent of the corporate capital of Benvenuto S.A.C.I. (Benvenuto). 3 Both Arcor and
Benvenuto are leading food producers in Argentina. The Commission was concerned by
the parties' combined market share of almost 47 percent in "industrial and home-made
marmalade." The Commission imposed conditions, including limitations on creating new
marmalade trademarks and advertising expenditures, a requirement that prices of certain
marmalade products be reported to the Secretariat, and a reduction of the term of a non-
compete clause with the sellers.
C. INVESTIGATIONS
In March 2006, the Commission implemented a precautionary measure in its investiga-
tion of the meat industry, whereby it ordered Mercado de Liniers S.A., the largest cattle
market in Argentina, to adopt all necessary measures to refrain from concerted practices
(agreements between consignment companies and purchasers) prior to cattle auctions, or
otherwise coordinating supply and demand in the market.4 The Commission also estab-
lished a control and monitoring system, whereby it may conduct inspections of marketers
without a preliminary notification.
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1. Law No. 25,156, Sept. 10, 1999.
2. La Ley [L.L.] (0893-D-06) (Arg.).
3. Opinion No. 569 (C554), available at http:I/www.mecon.gov.ar/cndc/home.htn (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
4. Antitrust Commission's investigation proceedings of the cattle market (Liniers), File No. S01:0384564/
2005 (C 1087), available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cndc/mc-mercado-liniers.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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D. ANTITRUST DECISIONS
In early 2006, the Ministry of Health for the province of Chaco filed a complaint with
the Commission against the Association of Anesthesiologists of the province of Chaco,
alleging that the Association had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by calling a strike to
protest the Federal Government's decision to create positions for new interns specializing
in anesthesiology.5 The Commission found this to be an illegal boycott or concerted
denial of services and ordered the Association and all anesthesiologists to resume services,
and refrain from organizing, encouraging or facilitating the denial of anesthesiology
services.
On April 7, 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeals in Civil and Commercial Matters (Panel 1) in the matter of Aeroandina/Felix,6
upholding the Commission's decision to fine the companies approximately US$60,000 for
filing a late merger notice with the Commission. 7
On August 24, 2006, the Federal Court of Appeals reversed a decision by the Commis-
sion to deny Isenbeck's request that the Commission suspend the effects of a merger be-
tween the large brewing companies, Quilmes and Brahma. 8 Isenbeck alleged that
Quilmes and Brahma failed to comply with the merger conditions imposed by the Com-
mission in 2003, being divestments of brewing plants and trademarks. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the approval of a transaction under the Law is subject to compliance with
the Commission's conditions. The Court held that the takeover, which has been sus-
pended since 2003, would not become effective until the Commission's requirements were
met, and ordered Quilmes and Brahma to suspend the implementation of the merger.
I. Developments in Australia
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
1. Trade Practices Amendment Bill
On January 1, 2007, the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) of 20069
amended the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (TPA) with changes expected to come into force
early in 2007. The key amendments include: significant strengthening of the corporate
and individual penalty and leniency regimes; new procedures for formal merger clearance
and authorization; expansion of the joint venture exemption for price fixing and exclusion-
ary provisions (market sharing, collective boycotts and collusive tendering); and collective
bargaining notification procedures for small business.
5. La Ley [L.L.] (SO: 80540/2006) (C. 1128) (Arg.).
6. Corte Suprema de Justica [CSJN], July 4, 2006, "Aeroandina S.A. y Fexis S.A. v. Apel. Resol. Comisi6n
Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia," La Ley [L.L.] (2006) (Arg.), available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/
cndc/aeroandina-fexis_0704_- 2006.pdf.
7. According to Section 8 of the Antitrust Law, economic concentrations should be notified prior to or
within one week after the execution of the agreement.
8. Case No. C.10.355/05, Cervecerfa Argentina SA Isenbeck's Appeal against Antitrust Commission's
Resolution, Panel III of the Federal Civil and Commercial Court of Appeal, Buenos Aires, Aug. 24, 2006.
9. Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 2006 (Aust.) (amending Trade Practices Act,
1974), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Actl.nsf/asmade/bytitle/35CFA305E5
D5FI95CA257220001 10A55?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
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2. Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act of 2006
The Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act of 2006 (the TPA Na-
tional Access Regime Act) came into force on October 1, 2006.10 The Act amends Austra-
lia's National Access Regime, which allows parties to seek access to services provided by
essential facilities such as airports and railways by way of "declaration." If a service is
"declared," the parties may seek independent arbitration, failing agreement, on the terms
and conditions for access.
3. Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act 2006
The Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act of 2006" commenced
on November 4, 2006, and by January 1, 2008, at the latest, will come into force by
amending the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 to recast the restrictions on the number of
media outlets that a media proprietor can own in one publication or broadcast area and
also relax the limits upon foreign ownership of Australian media organizations.
B. MERGER POLICY-MERGER REqEW PROCESS GUIDELINES 2006
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) implemented new
Merger Review Process Guidelines 200612 (the Process Guidelines) in July 2006, as the
result of an internal review by the ACCC of its informal merger clearance processes. The
Process Guidelines are intended to refine and expand upon the processes followed by the
ACCC when reviewing mergers and acquisitions under Section 50 of the TPA. Key
changes include increased guidance on the ACCC's information requirements, an expla-
nation of the ACCC's use of statements of issues, the expansion of information published
in the mergers public register, and clarification as to when public competition assessments
will be issued.
C. MISUSE OF MARKET POWER AND PRICE FIXING
Following an en banc decision of the Federal Court in 200313 holding that Australian
Safeway Stores Pty. Ltd., one of Australia's largest grocery retailers, had fixed the retail
price of bread and misused its market power in a number of instances, in January 2006 the
Federal Court penalized Safeway AU$8.9 million (approximately US$7 million).' 4 The
10. Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act, 2006 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii
.edu.au/au/legis/cth/nunact/tpaara2006922006429/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
11. The Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act, 2006 (Austl.), available at http://www
.con law.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Actl.nsf/asmade/bytitle/D52 lB53B624EF88DCA257220001B 119?
OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
12. AusTrRALIAN CO.MP1FlTION & CONSUMER COMMISSION [ACCC], MERGER REVIEW PROCESS
GUIDELINFS (2006), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtm/itemld/740765/fromltemld/
3737 (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). The process guidelines replace the Guideline for Informal Merger Review,
which was originally issued in October 2004.
13. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd. (2003) FCAFC
149, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/149.hul (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
14. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd. (No. 4) (2006)
FCA 21, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal-ct/2006/21.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2006).
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case involved allegations that Safeway refused to purchase further supplies of bread from a
baker that was supplying retailers who were discounting the price of bread, and recom-
menced purchasing from the baker when the discounting stopped.
D. COURT DECISIONS
1. ACCC v. Baxter Healthcare Pty15
Following an appeal to the full Federal Court by the ACCC, the Court handed down its
decision on August 24, 2006, affirming the Federal Court's decision that Baxter Health-
care had misused its market power and engaged in exclusive dealing for the purposes of
lessening competition in the market. However, there was no breach of the TPA because
the doctrine of 'derivative crown immunity' applied because Baxter's sales were made to
the government.
2. Sydney Airport Corp. v. Virgin Blue & Qantas16
The first major appellate judgment on the operation of Australia's National Access Re-
gime came down in October 2006. The Federal Court held that in assessing whether a
service should be "declared," the question is simply whether access or increased access
would promote competition. As a result, the Competition Tribunal's decision to declare
the airside service at Sydney Airport was upheld, and therefore the terms and conditions
of certain services provided at Sydney Airport are now able to be arbitrated after a failed
agreement between the parties.
3. Campbells Cash and Carry Pry. v. Fostif Pty17
In August 2006, the High Court handed down a decision allowing private lending com-
panies to fund class action lawsuits. The majority held that the funding did not abuse the
Court's process and was not contrary to public policy, despite the funding company hav-
ing had authority to settle the suit and retain legal counsel. Although this case did not
involve antitrust issues, the resulting increase in plaintiffs' available funding options may
lead to more class action suits being initiated for violations of the TPA.
III. Developments in Brazil
A. MERGER ACTIvrrY
On May 24, 2006, the Administrative Council of Economic Defense (CADE) condi-
tionally approved the merger of DirecTV and Sky, a subsidiary of News Corp., involving
15. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd. (2006) FCAFC 128,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2006/128.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
16. Sydney Airport Corp. Ltd. v. Australian Competition Tribunal (2006) FCAFC 146, available at htp ://
www.ausdii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2006/146.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
17. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) HCA 41, available at http://www.austlii.edu
.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/41 .html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
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national and multinational media companies.18 CADE's conditions related to (1) Pay-TV
content, (2) media rights on sporting events, and (3) some consumer issues.
On August 7, 2006, the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) and the Secretariat for
Economic Monitoring (SEAE) conditionally recommended CADE's approval in another
case involving some of the biggest paper manufacturers in Brazil.' 9 Votorantim and
Suzano sought to acquire control of their competitor Ripasa. The conditions aimed to
resolve SDE and SEAE's concerns about the possibility of coordination between Votoran-
tim and Suzano, who are direct competitors.
Finally, in May 2006, CSN, a major steel producer, submitted for review its proposed
acquisition of Prada, one of its key customers. 20 This transaction is currently being chal-
lenged by SIEMESP, a trade union.
B. CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
In November 2005 CADE found Microsoft and TBA Informitica guilty of exclusionary
practices. 21 Microsoft appealed CADE's decision, and at the same time invited CADE to
accept a reduction of its fine in exchange for withdrawing its judicial appeal. After receiv-
ing a positive opinion from CADE's Attorney General, CADE's Board accepted
Microsoft's offer to pay approximately US$2.2 million and closed the case.
Another important case in 2006 involved a longstanding investigation of a cartel in the
orange juice industry in which orange juice producers were investigated for price fixing
and market division.22 The price fixing occurred in the purchase of oranges to make the
juice. SDE obtained some documents through a dawn raid, but a judicial order held that
the documents could not be viewed (not even by SDE) once the parties involved ques-
tioned the way they had been obtained. SDE recommended that CADE reach a settle-
ment agreement, according to which the companies would not admit liability but still pay
approximately US$25 million. But after being challenged by the farmers that supply the
industry with oranges, the recommendation was unanimously denied by CADE.23
18. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE], Concentration Acts 53500.002423/2003
& 53500.029160/2004, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/jurisprudencia/dprocesso.asp?pc=2407 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2006).
19. See Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econ6mico [SDE], Minist~rio da Fazenda, Concentration Act No.
08012.010195/2004-19, available at http://www.fazenda.gov.br/seae/ittera/pdf/08012010195200419.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2006).
20. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE], Administrative Process No.
08012.004385/2006-51, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/andamento.asp?pro-codigo=3237
(last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
21. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE], Administrative Process No.
08012.008024/1998-49, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/andamento.asp?pro-codigo=928
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
22. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE], Administrative Process No.
08012.008372/1999-14, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/andamento.asp?pro-codigo=3364
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
23. Id. (CADE unanimously denied its approval of the agreement suggested by SDE during the public
hearing that took place on Nov. 23, 2006.).
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C. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
After years of judicial proceedings, a final decision has been issued by the Seventh Fed-
eral Circuit in the CADE/White Martins case, 24 upholding CADE's original decision that
White Martins had engaged in exclusionary practices in the CO2 market in 2002.25 The
fine imposed by CADE, of approximately US$22 million, was also upheld.
In September 2005, the Superior Court of Justice granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of AMCOR, a polyethylene terephthalate (PET) packaging producer, against an act
of the Brazilian Government that would lead to market foreclosure. The Brazilian Gov-
ernment had tried to oblige PET producers to obtain a significant part of their raw mater-
ials (PET resins) from local producers. The preliminary injunction was based, inter alia,
on competition arguments advocated by SDE and SEAE.
IV. Developments in Canada
A. MERGERS
On March 6, 2006, the Competition Bureau (Bureau) reported on its review of the
acquisition of Sogides Lt&e (Sogides), a publishing and distribution group, by Quebecor
Media Inc. (QM). 26 While the Bureau had no concerns regarding the state of competi-
tion in the publishing and distribution of French-language trade books, it did require-a
consent agreement to address the possibility of information exchanges between competi-
tors. Sogides' president, Pierre Lesp~rance, was a Director of Gestion Renaud-Bray, a
competitor of QMI's Archambault Group Inc. Pursuant to the consent agreement, Mr.
Lesprance agreed to resign from his directorship, and an independent agent was ap-
pointed to represent Mr. Lesp~rance on the Board.
On August 22, 2006, the Bureau outlined its reasons for determining that the acquisi-
tion of Cascades Resources (Cascades) by PaperlinX Canada Ltd. (PaperlinX) would likely
prevent or substantially lessen competition in the distribution of fine paper by full-line
merchants.27 A consent agreement was entered into requiring PaperlinX to divest of all of
Cascades' assets relating to the fine paper merchant business in British Columbia and
Alberta. The Bureau found that significant barriers to entry exist in the fine paper market
and that there would only be two full-line merchants remaining in British Columbia and
Alberta post-merger; i.e., the merged entity and Unisource Canada, Inc.
24. See J.F.-7, No. 2004.34.00.013282-7, 19.04.2004 (Brazil), available at http://processual-df.trfl.gov.br/
Processos/ProcessosSecaoOra/ConsProcSecaopro.php?SECAO=DF&proc=200434000132827 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2007).
25. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE], Administrative Process No.
08000.022579/97-05, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/ASPintranet/andamento.asp?pro-codigo=2048 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2006).
26. Competition Bureau, Acquisition of Sogides Ltee by Quebecor Media Inc., Mar. 2006, http://www.competi-
tionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfin?itemlD=2032&lg=e (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
27. Competition Bureau, Asset Acquisition by PaperlinX Canada Ltd. from Cascades Resources Fine Papers Group
Inc., Aug. 2006, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/intemet/index.cfin?itemID=2157&lg=e (last visited
Nov. 28, 2006).
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On October 31, 2006, the Bureau reported on its review of the acquisition of Arcelor
SA by Mittal Steel Company NV.28 The Bureau focused its review on the flat carbon steel
market in North America. While high barriers to entry exist in the steel industry, the
Bureau determined that, due to the significant countervailing power possessed by buyers
in the automotive sector-the largest consumer in the relevant steel market-and the low
risk that steel producers would engage in coordinated behavior, a sufficient level of com-
petition would remain post-transaction.
On September 22, 2006, the Bureau released its final Information Bulletin on Merger
Remedies in Canada.29 The highlights of the bulletin include a preference for structural, as
opposed to behavioral, remedies; a short divestiture period (three to six months) before
which a divestiture by trustee will be required; the potential inclusion of "crown jewel"
assets in the trustee sale; and a "no minimum price" requirement for trustee divestitures.
B. CRiwUNAL MATTERS
On January 9, 2006, the Bureau announced that Cascades Fine Papers Group Inc.,
Domtar Inc., and Unisource Canada, Inc. had each pled guilty to two counts of conspiring
to lessen competition unduly in the supply of carbonless sheet paper. 30 Each company was
sentenced to a fine of $12.5 million Canadian (approximately US$11 million), a record for
domestic conspiracy convictions. In addition, key personnel involved in the conspiracy
were ordered to be removed from their positions. This conspiracy conviction, as well as
two ongoing matters (alleged price fixing among gas retailers in Quebec and alleged anti-
competitive acts in the tour operators industry), underscore the Bureau's increased focus
on domestic cartels. The Bureau intends to release guidelines regarding its immunity
program by March 2007.
C. CIVIL MATTERS
On June 23, 2006, the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Commissioner's appeal and
set aside the Competition Tribunal's (Tribunal) decision in the abuse of dominance case
against Canada Pipe Company (Canada Pipe). 31 The Court found that the Tribunal had
applied the wrong test for assessing anticompetitive effects. It held that instead of evaluat-
ing the level of competition remaining in the market, the Tribunal should have applied a
"but for" test to assess whether the impugned practice prevented or lessened competition.
The Court also indicated that a valid business justification must have "a credible or pro-
efficiency rationale .. .which relates to and counterbalances the anticompetitive effects
and/or subjective intent of the acts." 32 The matter was referred back to the Tribunal for
28. Competition Bureau, Proposed Acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal, Oct. 2006, http://www.competition
bureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemlD=2224&lg=e (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
29. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Publishes Bulletin on Merger Remedies
(Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfmitemlD=2169&lg=e.
30. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Investigation Leads to Record Fine in Do-
mestic Conspiracy (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfin?itemlD
=2018&lg=e.
31. For a discussion of the Competition Tribunal's decision, see Fiona A. Schaeffer et al., International
Antitrust, 40 INT'L LAW. 159 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Year in Review].
32. Id.
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re-determination. 3 Canada Pipe is seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
On September 26, 2006, the Bureau issued, for public comment, a draft of its Informa-
tion Bulletin on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions as Applied to the Telecommunications Industry,
which provides guidance on the application of the Competition Act in light of the deregu-
lation of the telecom industry.3 4 The Bulletin indicates that the Bureau's involvem .nt in
applying the Competition Act to telecom firms' behavior is limited to those areas in which
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission has made a decision
to refrain from regulating. The Bureau highlighted four key concerns in the telecom
industry: raising rivals' costs and market foreclosure; predatory pricing; targeted pricing;
and bundling.
V. Developments in Chile
A. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Although the last reform to the antitrust legislation was enacted only a few years ago,35
the Executive recently sent a new initiative to Congress proposing further changes. This
new bill proposes a series of modifications, including an increase in the amounts of the
fines, greater investigative powers for the Antitrust Attorney General (the agency in
charge of prosecuting antitrust infringements), and a new leniency rule for persons re-
vealing anticompetitive agreements among competitors, all of which seek to strengthen
the enforcement of the Antitrust Statute. 36
B. MERGERS
In merger enforcement, the Antitrust Attorney General issued guidelines that publicize
the criteria employed by the prosecutor when analyzing the antitrust implications of hori-
zontal concentrations such as mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, etc. 37 After
months of gathering the opinions of several experts and of internal discussion, a final
version of the guidelines was released in late October 2006. There were no significant
rulings issued regarding merger enforcement in 2006.
C. CARTELS, PREDATORY PRICING, ABUSE OF DoMLmuA'-r PosrrioN
Important decisions were rendered in 2006 in connection with cartel enforcement,
predatory pricing, and abuse of dominant position. An important dissent regarding the
33. Comm'r of Competition v. Canada Pipe Co., [20061 F.C. 223 (appeal), [2006] F.C. 236 (cross-appeal).
34. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Seeks Public Comment on its Draft Bulletin
on the Abuse of Dominance in Telecommunications (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.competition
bureau.gc.ca/intemetindex.cfmitemD=2195&lg=e.
35. The current text of the Chilean Competition Law is available at http://www.fne.cll3bajar/competition
_law.zip (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
36. Bill No. 4630/2006 (Chile), available at http://www.bcn.cl (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
37. Fiscalia Nacional Economica [FNE], Guia Interna Para el Andlisis de Operaciones de Concentracidn
Horizontales (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.fne.cl (follow the "Gufa de Concentraci6n" link) (last visited
Mar. 19, 2007).
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burden of proof in cartel cases was issued in a case that condemned several medical oxygen
companies on collusion charges, and a two-step test was established by the Antitrust Court
in the analysis of predatory pricing cases.38 Also, a very significant decision pertaining to
the telecommunications market was rendered in October 2006, in which the Antitrust
Court issued a judgment ruling in favor of the plaintiff and against Chile's dominant and
most important local phone company. 39 This ruling, which solved the conflict between an
Internet Service Provider offering IP Telephone Services and the aforementioned domi-
nant local phone company, was controversial because the Antitrust Court's interpretation,
which found that IP services are not of a public nature, basically allowed Internet Service
Providers offering IP Telephone Services to offer such services without having to request a
concession from the competent authorities.
VI. Developments in China
A. INTRODUCTION
Provisions addressing competition issues in China remain scattered among several laws
and regulations. While temporary rules have been issued in recent years to provide in-
terim regulation of selected issues, most are relatively unclear and ambiguous in defining
the proscribed conduct. Enforcement has been very limited so far, but the still-forthcom-
ing Anti-Monopoly Law is expected to bring broader coverage, clarity, and enforcement.
B. LEGISLATWVE DEVELOPMENTS
In June 2006, after numerous revisions since 1994, the most recent version of the draft
Anti-Monopoly Law was approved by the State Council and submitted to the National
People's Congress (NPC) for approval.40 While it is expected to become law in 2007,
previous predictions of imminent passage have been wrong, and it is possible that the final
law will reflect further substantive changes.
In broad view, the current draft conforms to common international competition law
principles and practices, but there is much uncertainty and thus concern in some quarters
about the details and likely implementation. Importantly, the new law seems equally to
apply to both domestic and foreign companies, although it is unclear to what extent the
38. The cartel case decision was Judgment No. 43/2006, complaint filed by the Antitrust Attorney General
against Air Liquide Chile S.A. and Others, Sentencia No. 43/2006, Requerimiento del Fiscal Nacional Econdmico
en contra de Air Liquide Chile SA. y Otros (rendered on Sept. 7, 2006) (appeal pending before the Supreme
Court). The predatory pricing case was decided byJudgment No. 39/2006, suit filed by Quimel S.A. against
James Hardie Fibrocementos Ltda., Sentencia No. 39/2006, Demanda de Quimel S.A. contra James Hardie
Fibrocementos Ltda. (rendered on June 13, 2006) (appeal pending before the Supreme Court). Both decisions
are available at http://www.tdlc.cl.
39. This case was decided by Judgment No. 45/2006, suit filed by Voissnet S.A. and complaint filed by the
Antitrust Attorney General's Office against CTC, Sentencia No. 45/2006, Demanda de oissnet S.A. y Requer-
imiento de la FIVE en contra de CTC (rendered on Oct. 26, 2006) (appeal pending before the Supreme Court),
available at http://www.tdlc.cl.
40. For the approval of the draft Anti-Monopoly Law by the State Council, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/
legal/2006-06/08/content._4661181.htm. For the first review (in Chinese) of the draft law by the National
People's Congress see http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-06/28/content_4760486.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2007).
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new Anti-Monopoly Authority will pursue large Chinese state-owned enterprises for vio-
lations of their generally dominant market positions. Similarly, the most recent draft res-
urrects a prohibition on administrative (government) abuses of power with
anticompetitive effects, but some observers have voiced skepticism about how this can be
implemented in practice.
C. CoNDucr ENFORCEMENT
Existing Chinese laws and regulations provide limited coverage of competition issues,
including prohibitions on price-fixing, bid-rigging, tying, predatory pricing, and price dis-
crimination, as well as regulations governing the pricing and other activities of dominant
firms. But in many cases the proscribed conduct never has been defined in law, regula-
tion, or practice, and the limited public reporting of enforcement actions in China makes
it difficult to ascertain the extent of any enforcement.
D. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Given the apparent lack of enforcement to date, the greatest concern for most multina-
tional companies is to comply with the existing Chinese merger control scheme. In the
last nearly four years, more than 100 filings have been made by foreign investors (the
scheme does not reach purely domestic transactions) under the scheme. While no trans-
action is known to have been enjoined or abandoned solely as a result of competitive
concerns to this point, it appears that several recent mergers have been examined closely
under a relatively new second-phase review and hearing process; but again, the lack of
transparent public reporting makes tracking enforcement policy and procedural shifts
somewhat difficult and unreliable.
VII. Developments in the European Union
A. MERGERS
1. National Champions
A notable development in European mergers has been the European Member States'
attempted protection or creation of "national champions," particularly in the energy and
banking sectors:
0 In spite of the Commission granting clearance, the Spanish regulator initially at-
tempted to block the purchase of the Spanish energy supplier Endesa by German
energy supplier, E.ON. Following sustained pressure from the Commission, it
withdrew its objections;41
41. See Press Release, Europa, Mergers: Commission Rules Against Spanish Energy Regulator's Measures
Concerning E.ON's Bid for Endesa (Sept. 26, 2006) (translated version), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.doreference=ip/06/1265&amp;format=HTML&amp;aged=O&amp;language=EN&
amp;guiLanguage=en (hereinafter Europa Press Release]. For an authentic version, see Reglamento (CE) n
139/2004, Sobre las Concentrationes, art. 21 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/coinm/competi-
tion/mergers/ases/additional-data/m4197_es.pdf; see also Spain Limits Conditions o  Endesa Deal, THE TIMES
(London), Nov. 6, 2006.
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" The French government controversially backed the merger of Suez and Gaz de
France to create a French national energy champion.42 This merger was approved
on November 14, 2006;
43
" The Italian bank, Unicredit, purchased HVB bank, and as a result Unicredit con-
trols two of the largest banks in Poland. The Polish government first attempted to
impose divestiture and is now appealing the clearance decision in the EU Court of
First Instance (CFI).44
2. Innovative Analytical Approaches
A relatively new aspect of the Commission's investigation of mergers is in the analysis
of unilateral effects, which seeks to avoid an enforcement gap where the merged entity is
not the clear market leader in terms of market share. This new approach was applied in
the T-Mobile/Telering case 45 where Tele.ring was a maverick in the market.46 An inter-
esting corollary to the unilateral effects analysis is the Commission's new reliance on the
concept of bidding markets, as for example, in the Abertis and Autostrade case. 47
3. Sony/BMG
The Commission's clearance decision of the merger of Sony and BMG was challenged
in the CFI. For the first time, the CFI annulled a Commission clearance decision. 48 The
decision also represents a careful step back from the Airtours decision, 49 where the CFI
laid down stringent conditions for blocking a merger on grounds of collective dominance.
The CFI now appears to be allowing the Commission more room to maneuver in using
collective dominance theories against oligopolies.50 Also, as a consequence of the deci-
sion, Sony BMG has been obliged to re-notify the merger, which the Commission is now
re-considering in light of the CFI's requirements.
42. See Peggy Hollinger et al, Gaz de France and Suez Look at Tie-up to Figbt Enel, FINANCIAL, TiMiES
(London), Feb. 24, 2006, at 1.
43. See Europa Press Release, supra note 41.
44. Case T-41/06, Republic of Poland v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R., available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c096/c_09620060422enOO170018.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
45. Case Comp/M. 3916, T-Mobile Austria/Telering, 2006 E.C.R., available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3916_20060426 -20600_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
46. Philip Lowe, Director General, European Commission, DG Competition, EC Merger Regulation: Is
There Really a New Approach?, Address at European Competition Day 2006 (June 19, 2006) (transcript
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/misc/european-competition-day/lowe.pdf.
47. Case No. Comp/M.4249-Abertis Autostrade, 2006 E.C.R., available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4249_20060922_203 10_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
48. Case T-464/04, Impala v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R., available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form
.pl?lang=en&Submit=submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docj=docjo&
numaff=T-464%2F04&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100 (last visited Mar. 19,
2007).
49. Case IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice, 1999 E.C.R., available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competi-
tion/mergers/cases/decisionslml524 19990922_610 en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
50. Case T-464/04, Impala v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R., supra note 48.
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B. ABUSE OF DOMINAINr PosrriON
In March 2004, the Commission adopted a decision finding that Microsoft had abused
its dominant position in the market for PC operating systems.5' On March 10, 2006, the
Commission announced that Microsoft still was not compliant with the decision,5 2 and
imposed penalty payments of 280.5 million euros. Microsoft has appealed.5 3
C. ANTICOMPETITWVE PRACTICES
In May 2001, the Commission prohibited as anticompetitive, GlaxoSmithKline's (GSK)
dual pricing system for pharmaceutical products in Spain. Under the system, GSK re-
quired its Spanish wholesalers to pay a higher price for products exported to other Mem-
ber States than the price paid when reselling the same products on the domestic market.5 4
GSK successfully appealed the Commission's decision to the CFI. In a decision issued on
September 27, 2006, the CFI held that the dual pricing scheme did not have the object of
restricting competition to the detriment of consumers. The Commission had not taken
into account the specific characteristics of the pharmaceuticals market, where prices are
not determined by supply and demand, but are set by state authorities. However, because
the scheme could have a restrictive effect on competition, the Commission must consider
whether it met the conditions for exemption under Article 81(3). Because the Commis-
sion had not considered the benefits of the scheme in terms of innovation and research




The Commission adopted four new cartel decisions in 2006,56 all of which were discov-
ered through the "confession" of an immunity applicant. The limit on the fines for any
infringement is 10 percent of the worldwide turnover and, as the Commission seeks to
51. Case Comp/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, 2004 E.C.R., available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/3 7792/en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
52. Press Release, Europa, Competition: Commission Sends Newsletter to Microsoft on Compliance with
Decision (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=ip/06/298&
fonnat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
53. Press Release, Microsoft, Statement on July 12 Fine Announced by European Commission (July 12,
2006), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/jul06/07-12EUFinesPR.mspx.
54. Press Release, Europa, Comnission Prohibits Glaxo Wellcome's Dual Pricing System in Spain (May 8,
2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=ip/01/661 &format=HTML&
aged= I &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
55. Press Release, Europa, The Court of First Instance Annuls in part the Decision Prohibiting Glaxo from
Selling its Medicines at Different Prices According to the Place of Reimbursement (Sept.27, 2006), available
at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=CJE/6/79& format=HTML&aged=& lan-
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. Judgment, Case T-168/01, Glaxo Smith Kline Servs. v. Comm'n, 2006
E.C.R., available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=submit&alldocs=alldocs&
docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=T- 168%2F0 I&datefs&datefe&nomusuel=&
domaine=&mots=&resmax=100 (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
56. In the fields of acrylic glass, copper fittings, Dutch road bitumen, and bleach chemicals, the Commis-
sion re-adopted a decision it had taken in relation to steel beams, after the CFI annulled the Commission's
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pursue stronger enforcement of competition policy, fines in recent cases have come very
close to that threshold.
2. Leniency
The Commission has also published a draft revised Leniency Notice which, among
other things, seeks to codify the oral procedure for the submission of corporate statements
and to introduce a marker system. 57 The draft notice does, however, retain a significant
degree of discretion for the Commission.
E. SECTOR INVESTIGATIONS
As previously reported,5 8 in June 2005, the Commission announced sector investiga-
tions into competition in European energy markets and financial services markets. The
Commission has published preliminary reports in relation to various aspects of both in-
quiries.5 9 The reports highlight a number of barriers to liberalization in the markets and,
subject to the outcome of public consultations, 60 the Commission will seek to impose
corresponding remedies. Following from the sector investigation into mobile roaming
charges6 1 and calls for self-reglation,62 the Commission tabled a roaming regulation63 in
July 2006 with the aim of bringing down the cost of roaming calls, particularly within the
European Union.
first decision on procedural grounds. See European Commission Cartel Cases, available at http://ec.europa
.eu/comm/competifion/cartels/cases/cases.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
57. Draft Commission Notice, Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, http://ec
.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/legislation/draftrevised_notice-en.pdf. For the press release and fur-
ther details, see Europa, Leniency Notice, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/legisla-
tion/leniencyjlegislation.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
58. 2005 Year in Review, spra note 31.
59. In February 2006, the Commission published a preliminary report of its findings in the energy markets
inquiry, which can be located at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007). In July 2006, the Commission published an interim report on the current ac-
counts and related services markets, which can be located at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
others/sector_inquiries/financialservices/public.consultation_2.htnl (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
60. The public consultations can be located at the following web addresses: http://ec.europa.eu/comm
competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/contributions.html (last visited Mar 19, 2007), and http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector inquiries/financial-services/publicconsultation_2.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2007).
61. Europa, Competition, Sector Inquiries-Roaming, http'./ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
others/sector_inquiries/roaming/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
62. Press Release, Europa, Commissioner Reding Welcomes EU-wide Investigation on Cost of Using Mo-
bile Phone Abroad (Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
ip/04/l458&format=HTML&aged=l &language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, Europa, Commission
Warns Consumers on Cost of Using Mobile Phone Abroad and Targets Lack of Price Transparency (July 11,
2005), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=ip/05/901 &format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
63. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Roaming on Public Mobile Networks (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/
informationsociety/activities/roaming/docs/regulation/regulation-en.pdf.
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VHI. Developments in France
A. MERGERS
1. CanalSat and TPS
On August 30, 2006, the Ministry of the Economy (Ministry) authorized the merger of
the two French satellite pay-TV platforms, CanalSat and TPS, after a Phase II investiga-
tion (requiring an advisory opinion by the French Competition Council before the Minis-
try could issue its decision) and the submission by the parties of fifty-nine commitments
aimed at maintaining a sufficient degree of competition in the pay-TV market, as well as
in upstream markets for the acquisition of movies and sports rights.64 The Ministry took
into account that pay-TV satellite platforms have already merged in other Member States
of the EU and that several telecom operators have recently entered the pay-TV market.
While the Ministry recognized that the new CanalSat/TPS entity would likely be the sole
credible bidder for the acquisition of major broadcasting rights, the Ministry considered
that the increased purchasing power of the new entity would be partially constrained by
the strong position of some rights owners, such as American movie studios and the French
football league.
2. Competence of the French Competition Council
Under French competition law, the Ministry of the Economy is responsible for merger
control procedures, and while it may request advisory opinions from the Competition
Council, it is ultimately the Conseil d'ltat, the French supreme administrative court, that
has the authority to review the Ministry's merger control decisions. However, in a deci-
sion rendered on October 20, 2006, the Competition Council declared itself competent to
review a decision issued by the Ministry. 65 In this case, a company had been ordered by
the Ministry to divest itself of certain of its warehouses, via a bidding process, in order to
proceed with a subsequent merger. After the Ministry had approved the successful bidder,
a third party brought a complaint before the Competition Council arguing that anticom-
petitive collusion had taken place. The Competition Council distinguished between, on
the one hand, the appreciation and approval of the chosen acquirer, which remains the
domain of the Ministry under Article 430-8 of the French Commercial Code and ulti-
mately of the Conseil d'ltat, and on the other hand, the review of the actual bidding
process which, if anticompetitive, would then fall under the competence of the Competi-
tion Council under Article 420-1 of the French Commercial Code.
64. Bulletin Officiel de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Rbpression des Fraudes, Lettre du
ministre de l'6conomie, des finances et de l'industrie du 30 aofit 2006, aux conseds de la societ Vivendi Universal,
relative a une concentration dams le secteur de la tildvision payante, No. 7 (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www
.minefi.gouv.fr/dgccrf/boccrf/0607bis/page3 .pdf.
65. Conseil de la Concurrence, Republic Francaise, Decision No. 06-D-31 (Oct. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/06d31 .pdf.
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B. ENFORCEMENT
In 2005, the French Competition Council issued twenty-eight opinions and ninety-
eight decisions, of which thirty-one were penalty decisions amounting to a total of 754.4
million euros (approximately US$938.5 million) in fines.66
1. Leniency Program
On April 11, 2006, the Competition Council issued its procedural notice on the French
leniency program, providing guidelines based on Section IV of Article L. 464-2 of the
French Commercial Code.67 While the leniency program was first introduced in 2002,
the notice provided additional and practical guidance to enterprises, especially regarding
the conditions to be fulfilled in order to benefit from the program. To be eligible for the
leniency program, enterprises must provide the French competition authorities with in-
formation or evidence of a prohibited agreement on a market where they did not previ-
ously have any such evidence.
If the Competition Council already possesses certain information on the practices re-
vealed, it may still grant total immunity from fines, subject to certain conditions. Should
an enterprise not qualify for full immunity, it may still benefit from a reduction in fines if
it provides the Competition Council with evidence of the alleged infringement which, in
addition to the evidence already in the Competition Council's possession, significantly
strengthens its ability to prove the alleged infringement.
On April 6, 2006, the Competition Council issued its first decision applying the leni-
ency program in one of seventeen pending leniency requests. 68 In this case, the enterprise
that revealed the cartel benefited from a total immunity from fines, which could have
amounted to 1.25 million euros (approximately US$1.56 million), approximately 2 percent
of its annual turnover.
2. Anticompetitive Agreements
On March 16, 2006, the Competition Council found that, between 1997 and 2000,
thirteen manufacturers of luxury perfume and cosmetics (including Chanel, Dior, Guer-
lain) entered into resale price maintenance agreements with the distributors in their com-
mercial networks, and in particular the national chains Marionnaud, Nocib6, and
S~phora. 69 The Competition Council, taking into account the duration of the practices
(from 1997 to 2000) and the size of the market affected, imposed fines totaling 46.2 mil-
lion euros (approximately US$ 57.48 million) on both the perfume manufacturers and
their retailers.
66. TrIE FRENCH COMPETITION COUNCIL 2005 ANNUAL REPORT SUNLMARY 26, available at http://www
.conseil-concurrence.fr/doc/synthese05_uk.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
67. C. COM. § IV, art. L. 464-2, May 15, 2001, available at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/doc/leniency
.pdf.
68. Conseil de la Concurrence, Republic Francaise, Decision No. 06-D-09, Apr. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/06dO9.pdf.
69. Conseil de la Concurrence, Republic Francaise, Decision No. 06-D-04, Mar. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/06d04.pdf.
VOL. 41, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 153
TX. Developments in Germany
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
In August 2006, the Federal Cartel Organization (FCO) announced a reorganization, in
which it reassigned the individual decision making boards along broader industry lines.70
B. MERGER CONTROL
As of December 2006, the FCO had opened seventeen Phase II merger investigations in
2006,7 1 which resulted in three prohibitions, the most significant being the proposed
merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1. 72 According to the FCO, the merger
would have strengthened an existing duopoly in the market for television advertising and
would also have strengthened Springer's existing dominant market position in two news-
paper-related markets.
C. CARTELS
The FCO issued only two decisions that imposed (fairly moderate) fines on pharmaceu-
tical wholesalers and furniture transporters for violating the prohibition against cartels. 73
1. Revised Leniency Guidelines
In March 2006, the FCO published its revised leniency guidelines. 74 The new guide-
lines introduce a "marker system" under which cartel members can reserve a leniency rank
for up to eight weeks by providing certain information. The FCO also clarified the condi-
tions for the granting of immunity or a reduction of fines. An applicant who is the first to
come forward and enables the FCO to obtain a search warrant against the other cartel
members will obtain immunity from fines.
After a search has been conducted, the first company that cooperates with the FCO and
submits evidence to prove the offence, can also obtain immunity. Firms that led the cartel
activity or coerced others to participate in the cartel cannot qualify for full immunity.
However, they and the other cartel members who have lost the "race" for first place can
70. Press releases, guidelines, and all decisions of the Federal Cartel Office cited below, as well as an
organizational chart, are available on the website of the FCO at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de (last visited
Nov. 28, 2006).
71. A significant number of Phase 1H reviews recently related to hospital markets; see most recently
Marienhaus GmbH/Krankenhaus Ottweiler, Kinderklinik Kohlhof, Phase H clearance decision of June 6,
2006.
72. Axel Springer/ProSiebenSat. I Media, prohibition decision of 19 January 2006; see also FCO Press Re-
leases dated January 11, 16, and 24, 2006. Springer is one of the major newspaper publishers in Germany,
and ProSiebenSat.l combines four private TV channels.
73. See press releases dated September 1, 2006 (pharmaceutical wholesalers) and April 19, 2006 (furniture
transport).
74. The guidelines replace the initial leniency guidelines published in 2000. Bundes Kartellant, Immunity
from and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, Notice No. 9/2006 (Mar. 7, 2006), available at http:I/www
.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/06_Bonusregelung-e.pdf. See also Press Release, FCO (Mar.
15, 2006).
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still have their fines reduced by up to 50 percent, provided they cooperate with the
authority.
2. New Fining Guidelines
In September 2006, the FCO published its first fining guidelines.75 The FCO limits its
fining power to the revenues that the offender has achieved in the relevant products and/
or services markets in Germany. The fine can be up to 30 percent of such revenues,
depending on the severity of the infringement. The basic amount can be increased or
decreased by taking into account factors such as (1) deterrence, (2) aggravating circum-
stances (e.g., intent, activity, retaliation, etc.), and (3) mitigating circumstances (e.g., com-
pensation, forced participation, passivity, etc.).
3. Private Enforcement
In December 2006, the Regional Court in Diisseldorf will hear oral arguments in the
first ever collective action for damages based on a cartel decision in Germany.76
X. Developments in Hong Kong
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
At present, only two industry sectors-the telecommunications and broadcasting indus-
tries-are covered by Hong Kong's sector-specific competition law. 77 But the push to
introduce a comprehensive, cross-sector competition law for Hong Kong has gathered
momentum during 2006. The Competition Policy Review Committee, which was ap-
pointed in June 2005 to review the effectiveness of Hong Kong's competition policy, pub-
lished a report of its recommendations on July 4, 2006 (the CPRC Report). 78 The CPRC
Report recommended that a new comprehensive competition law, covering all sectors of
the economy, should be introduced into Hong Kong. It further recommended the setting
up of a Competition Commission to enforce this new law. In response, on November 6,
2006, the Government issued a discussion document seeking the public's view on whether
there is a need for a cross-sector competition law in Hong Kong, and if so, what types of
75. Bekanrnmachung Nr. 38/2006, Uberdie Festsetzung von GeldboBen (§ 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 GWB), Sept.
2006, http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Bussgeldleitlinien.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2007); see also Press Release, FCO, BundesKartellamt verabschiedet BuBgeldleitlinien (Sept. 26, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Bussgeldleidinien.pdf.
76. Cartel Damage Claims, available at http://www.cdcag.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
77. There are fair competition provisions in the Telecommunications Ordinance regulating the telecom-
munications sector. Telecommunications Ordinance, (2004) Cap. 106, § 7P (H.K.). The Telecommunica-
tions Authority is responsible for enforcing these provisions in the telecommunications sector. For more
information, see Executive Summary, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, Mergers and Acquisitions in
Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets, available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/gui-
dance-notes/gn20040503.summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
78. Legislative Council Panel on Economic Services, Report of the Competition Policy Review Commit-
tee, LC Paper No. CB(1)1923/05-06(01) (July 4, 2006), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO5-06/en-
glish/panels/es/papers/es07l9cb 1-1923-1 e.pdf.
VOL. 41, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 155
conduct such a law should prohibit and what institutions should enforce such a law. 79 The
deadline for submission of views was February 5, 2007.
B. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
Since December 1, 2005, the Telecommunications Authority (TA) has made three more
decisions under the still relatively new mergers and acquisitions provisions of the Tele-
communications Ordinance (the TO)80 by which the TA may investigate and regulate any
change in the shareholding or ownership of a licensee if it finds that such change has, or is
likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in any relevant telecommu-
nications market.8 l
1. The Acquisition Of Shares in China Resources Peoples Telepbone by China Mobile
On December 22, 2005, the TA consented to a proposal from China Mobile (Hong
Kong) Limited (CMHK) to acquire China Resources Peoples Telephone Company Lim-
ited (Peoples).8 2 The TA concluded that the transaction was unlikely to have the effect of
substantially lessening competition in the Hong Kong market for the retail supply of mo-
bile telephony services to local and inbound roaming users, because: (1) there was no
competitive overlap between the parties to the merger; (2) there was no evidence that the
transaction would have a significant constraining effect on competition; and (3) any advan-
tage that Peoples might gain would increase competition between mobile operators in the
local market.
2. The Joint Ownership Of Hong Kong CSL and New World PCS Limited
On March 22, 2006, the TA consented to a request from Hong Kong CSL (CSL) and
New World PCS Limited (NWPCS) for consent to combine and integrate the mobile
telephony network businesses of the two entities.8 3 The TA concluded that the transac-
tion was unlikely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in the Hong
Kong market for the retail supply of mobile voice and data services because: (1) although
CSL and NWPCS were competitors, the TA did not consider them to be as vigorous or as
effective competitors against each other as they appeared to be against other mobile net-
work operators; (2) the TA was satisfied that the transaction, which would reduce the
number of mobile network operators from six to five, would not appreciably increase the
risk of coordinated conduct in the future; and (3) the TA had not identified any additional
79. Press Release, Government of Hong Kong, Government Launches Consultation on Competition Pol-
icy (Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general200611/06/P200611060141.htm.
80. Telecommunications Ordinance, (2004) Cap. 106, § 7P (H.K.).
81. The TA has issued guidelines under the TO. See Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, Mergers
and Acquisitions in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets, available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/zh/report-
paper-guide/guidance-notes/gn_20040503.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
82. Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Decision Granting Consent Under the Telecommunica-
tions Ordinance to the Acquisition of Peoples by China Mobile, Dec. 22, 2006, CAB Ref. No. CDNO197,
available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/report/rp20051223.pdf.
83. Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Decision Granting Consent Under the Telecommunica-
tions Ordinance to Joint Ownership of CSL and NWPCS, Mar. 22, 2006, 2006, CAB Ref. No. CDN0200,
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/reportlrp2006O3 22.pdf.
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indicators or evidence that price rises and output reductions for mobile voice and data
services in Hong Kong would be likely as a result of the transaction.
3. Asia Netcom Hong Kong Limited and Its Potential Consolidation with C2C (Hong Kong)
Limited (C2C)
On August 23, 2006, Asia Netcom Hong Kong Limited (Asia Netcom) announced that
China Netcom had completed the sale of its entire ownership of Asia Netcom to an inves-
tor group at a price of US$402 million.8 4 On September 8, 2006, after a preliminary
competition assessment in accordance with Section 7P of the TO and the TA's Merger
and Acquisition Guidelines, the TA decided not to undertake a full competition investiga-
tion into the transaction,85 because: (1) given the existence of competing cable systems and
low barriers to entry due to available external facilities capacity, it was unlikely that the
aggregation of the cable capacity of AsiaNetcom and C2C would increase their market
power; (2) as there were a total of twenty-five licensed operators providing overland and
submarine cable facilities to and from Hong Kong, the loss of competition between Asia
Netcom and C2C would be unlikely to have any material effect on competition in the
overall market; (3) the transaction would be unlikely to increase the risk of collusion in the
market; and (4) it would be unlikely that Asia Netcom or C2C would be able to sustain
any price increases without significant competitive restraint from competitors and
customers.
XI. Developments in Ireland
A. LEGISLATION
The Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 repealed a 1987 Ministerial Order prohibit-
ing certain trading practices in the grocery sector.8 6 The new legislation removed the
controversial ban on below-cost selling of grocery goods.
B. MERGERS
The most significant merger decision in 2006 was the prohibition by the Competition
Authority of the notified Kingspan/Xtratberm acquisition by Kingspan Group ple of Lea-
84. See Press Release, Asia Netcom, China Netcom Completes Sale of Asia Netcom: Ownership of Asia
Netcom Transfers to International Investor Group (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://www.asianetcom.comi
inter/index.asp?name=aboutnewsroom_view&id=95.
85. Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Report on the Competition Impact of the Change of
Ownership of [Asia Netcom] and its Potential Consolidation with C2C, Sept. 8, 2006, CAB Ref. No.
CDN0204, available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/report/rp2006O9O8.pdf.
86. Competition (Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act No. 4/2006)(Ir.), available at http://www.entemp.ie/publica-
tions/commerce/2006/competitionamendmentact.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). The Act, with the excep-
tion of § 5(2), entered into force on Mar. 20, 2006, in accordance with the Competition (Amendment) Act
2006 (Commencement) Order, 2006 (S.I. No. 127/2006) (Ir.), available at http://www.entemp.ie/publiea-
tions/sis/2 006/si 1 27.pdf.
VOL. 41, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 157
nort Group following a full Phase 11 investigation.8 7 Both companies are involved in the
production and sale of insulation materials in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The
merger was prohibited primarily because it would have resulted in an unacceptably high
level of concentration on the Irish market. This was only the second time the Authority
has blocked a proposed merger since the relevant provisions of the Competition Act 2002
went into effect88
The Competition Act provides for strict time periods within which the Authority must
make determinations in Phase I merger investigations. In the Topaz/Statoil case, which
involved a merger between two large fuel importers and resellers, the Authority failed to
make its determination by the date required under the Competition Act due to an admin-
istrative error. Consequently, the parties became automatically entitled to put the merger
into effect.8 9
C. CRIMINAL CARTELS
The Director of Public Prosecutions secured fifteen criminal convictions in a case in-
volving a price-fixing cartel in the home heating oil sector in the west of Ireland.90 This
was the first time a jury trial was held for a competition offense in Europe. Most of the
defendants were ordered to pay fines, and one was sentenced to six months imprisonment,
which was suspended for one year. An individual charged with aiding and abetting an
alleged cartel of Ford Motor car dealers faces trial in January 2007, in a case currently
before the Central Criminal Court.9 1
D. CONDUCT CASES
The Authority initiated High Court proceedings against the Irish Medical Organization
(IMO), the professional body representing doctors in Ireland. 92 It contended that during
a fee dispute, the IMO coordinated the behavior of its general practitioner (GP) members
by, inter alia, directing or recommending the fees that GPs should charge for providing
medical information to life insurance companies.
87. Ireland Competition Authority, Determination No. M/06/039 Kingspan/Xtratherm, available at http://
www.tca.ie/MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifications/MergerNotifications.aspx?selected-item=265 (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2006).
88. Competition Act, 2002 (Commencement) Order 2002 (S.I. No. 199/2002) (Ir.), pt. 3 (Mergers and
Acquisitions), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
89. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, Agreement Between the Competition Authority and
Topaz (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?se-
lected item=176. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, Statement Regarding the Acquisition of
Statoil by Topaz (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsRe-
leases.aspx?selected_item= 175.
90. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, Opening Statement by the Chairperson of the Compe-
tition Authority, Mr. Bill Prasifika, to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Enterprise and Small Business (Oct.
25, 2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item
=177.
91. Id.
92. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, The Competition Authority Begins High Court Pro-
ceedings Against the Irish Medical Organization (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublica-
tions/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item= 10.
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In another case, the High Court refused to grant a declaration sought by the Authority
that a proposed rationalization scheme by Irish beef processors was contrary to Irish and
EU competition law. The Court held that the Authority failed to establish that the pro-
posed scheme had the object or effect of restricting competition in the relevant markets. 93
The Authority's appeal to the Supreme Court in this case is likely to be heard in 2007.
The Authority closed its two-year investigation without taking action against alleged
abuses of dominance by TicketMaster in connection with pricing practices in the Irish
market for outsourced ticketing services for events of national or international appeal.94
Although the Authority found that TicketMaster accounted for 100 percent of the rele-
vant market, it made no finding of dominance, but concluded that the practices at issue
involved no abuse of a dominant position. This was due to the countervailing buyer
power of event organizers (who are TicketMaster's customers).
The Authority reached a settlement with two distributors in its investigation into the
distribution of JCB agricultural and industrial equipment in Ireland in June 2006, closing
its investigation into a retail sales joint venture agreement concluded between the parties
without court proceedings or any admission of liability.95 The Authority also concluded
its investigation into alleged infringements of competition law by Timas Limited, trading
as Galileo Ireland (Galileo), which operates the computerized reservation system used by
most travel agents in Ireland. 96 The Authority received commitments from Galileo to
deal with future requests from third parties for access to its computerized reservation sys-
tem in an open, transparent, proportionate, and nondiscriminatory manner.
XI. Developments in Israel
A. NEW ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
In February 2006, the Antitrust Commissioner published guidelines concerning debt
holding arrangements between competitors and the circumstances under which they con-
stitute a prohibited Restrictive Arrangement.97 The guidelines provide the criteria for
reviewing such arrangements, including the degree of influence that the creditor has on
the debtor's business (in accordance with the kind of debt holding arrangements and the
creditor's rights under the loan), the financial strength of the debtor, the amount of the
debt and its proportion in relation to the scope of the business, any additional arrange-
93. Competition Auth. v. Beef Indus. Dev. Society Ltd., [2006] (Unreported, H. Ct., McKechnie J.).
94. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, The Competition Authority Announces Closure of its
Investigation of TicketMaster Ireland (Mar. 16, 2006), available at http'J/www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/News
Releases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected item= 16.
95. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, The Competition Authority Accepts Commitments
from Irish Distributors ofJCB Agricultural and Industrial Equipment (June 14, 2006), available at http://www
.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected_item=2.
96. See Press Release, The Competition Authority, Investigation by the Competition Authority Leads to
Greater Access to Travel Reservation System (Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/
NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selectedjitem=20.
97. Israel Antitrust Authority, Guidelines 1/06-debt holding relationship between competitors as a re-
strictive arrangement, available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il (publication no. 5000202) (last visited Nov. 30,
2006).
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ments existing between the parties, and the circumstances of the transaction along with its
background.
B. CMIL ENFORCEMENT
In August 2006, the Antitrust Court issued its decision concerning the Multilateral In-
terchange Fee (MIF) in the Israeli Visa credit card system.95 MIF and the appropriate
methodology for setting merchant fees have been the subject of extensive briefing and
hearings in the last four years. The Antitrust Court held that, to avoid antitrust liability,
the MIF rate must be based solely on costs reflecting the risk of the transactions, instead
of all issuing and clearing expenses as the Visa companies argued. The Court's decision is
in line with the international trend requiring that MIF be based on the costs of transaction
authorization, ensuring payment and debt financing. Following the Court's judgment, the
Commissioner and the credit card companies entered an agreement wherein, for the first
time, the MasterCard system will be opened for clearing by other acquirers99 not related
to Bank Ha'Poalim (the single MasterCard issuer in Israel). In addition, the agreement
reduces the MIF from 1.25 percent to 0.875 percent.
C. MERGERS
1. Dor-Alon/Sonol
In June 2006, the Supreme Court reversed the Antitrust Court's decision to approve,
subject to conditions, a merger between Dor-Alon and Sonol, two of the four largest
competitors in the highly concentrated domestic fuel market.°- The Supreme Court thus
agreed with the Commissioner's initial decision to oppose the merger. 10 1 The Supreme
Court has not yet published the reasoning for its decision. Interestingly, the Antitrust
Court decided to approve the merger despite its findings that the merger: (1) would elimi-
nate Dor-Alon as a maverick competitor; (2) would result in a significant increase in con-
centration; and (3) given the major entry barriers to this industry, would probably harm
competition in the fuel market. The Antitrust Court's reasoning for the approval relied
on anticipated developments in the energy industry; i.e., an expected divestiture and priva-
tization of the state-owned oil refineries. The Antitrust Court considered the possibility
that a future purchaser of the refineries would become a competitor in the fuel marketing
segment and concluded that the merger was a legitimate means to strengthen competitors
that do not own a refinery and thus enhance competition.
98. ATF [Anti Trust Filing] (Jet.) 4630/01 Bank Leumi v. the Antitrust Comm'r, [2006] (not yet published).
99. The Visa system already has more than one acquirer. The Israel Antitrust Authority aims to reach a
total set of agreements concerning credit card cross clearing which will encompass all companies in the credit
card industry.
100. CA 3398/06 Antitrust Auth. v. Dor Alon Energy Isr. (1998) Ltd., TE 2006(2) 3848.
101. Israel Antitrust Authority, Reasons for the Antitrust Commissioner's Objection to the Merger between
Dor Alon Energy Israel (1998) Ltd. and Sonol Israel Ltd. (Nov. 02, 2005) (publication no. 5000139), available
at http://www.antitnist.gov.il.
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2. Paz Oil Company/Oil Refinery-Ashdod
In September 2006, the Commissioner approved, subject to conditions, the merger of
Paz Oil Company, Israel's largest oil company, and Ashdod Oil Refinery.102 Paz acquired
Ashdod from the State of Israel in a tender offering, following a government decision to
split and privatize the state-owned oil refiners. The merger approval followed a pre-bid
opinion of the Commissioner, stating that oil companies could acquire Ashdod, consider-
ing Ashdod's relatively small size and the advantages of vertical integration, which will
benefit consumers. The Commissioner's approval conditions aim to ensure that Ashdod
remains competitive, and they focus on Paz's market power in gas stations and liquid
petroleum gas distribution.
XIII. Developments in Italy
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
In late December 2005, Law No. 262/2005, the Credit Reorganization Act, 10 3 trans-
ferred antitrust powers from the Bank of Italy to the Italian Competition Authority (ICA).
In July 2006, Decree-Law No. 223/2006 (the Bersani Decree) introduced important
changes to Law No. 287/90 (the Competition Act).' 04 In accordance with EU Regulation
No. 1/2003 (Modernization Regulation), 05 it sets out provisions empowering the ICA to
impose interim measures, implement leniency programs, and adopt decisions based on
remedies proposed by parties under investigation, that remove the concerns of the ICA.
B. CARTELS
In April 2006, the ICA levied fines on the main industrial gas producers in Italy, after
they were found to have engaged in anticompetitive market partitioning. 10 6 The ICA
determined that the cartel lasted thirteen years (from 1991 until 2004) and involved the
major market players (including Air Liquide and Linde). The ICA imposed total fines of
approximately 57 million euros (approximately US$75 million).
In June 2006, the ICA closed an investigation into a number of oil companies in relation
to their anticompetitive arrangement to supply major Italian airports with jet fuel.107 The
ICA found that the purpose and effect of the arrangement was to partition the market and
foreclose entry by new operators, including airlines intending to provide their own sup-
plies. The ICA fined ENI, Esso, Kuwait, Shell, Tamoil, and Total approximately 315.4
million euros (approximately US$415 million) in total.
102. Israel Antitrust Authority, Commissioner's Decision in the matter of Paz Oil Company Ltd with Oil
Refinery - Ashdod Ltd, (publication no. 5000447), available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il (last visited Mar. 19,
2007).
103. Law No. 262/2005 of Dec. 28, 2005, Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati
finanziari, Gazz. Uff. No. 301 (Dec. 28, 2005).
104. Law No. 287/90 of Oct. 10, 1990, Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato, Competition
and Fair Trading Act (Competition Act), Gazz. Uff. No.240 (Oct. 13, 1990).
105. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of Dec. 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competi-
tion (Modernization Regulation), 2003 OIJ. (LI)I.
106. ICA Decision No. 15392, in case 1603, Gas Technici (Technical Gases), published in Bulletin No. 17/2006.
107. ICA Decision No. 15604, in case 1641, let Fuel, published in Bulletin No. 23/2006.
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C. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
In February 2006, the ICA imposed fines of 290 million euros (approximately US$382
million) on ENI, the Italian incumbent gas operator, for having abused its dominant mar-
ket position by hindering the entry of independent operators into the national market for
the wholesale supply of natural gas.1i18
D. MERGER CONT-ROL
In July 2006, the ICA determined that the merger of Alitalia and Volare could not be
authorized as originally proposed.' 09 It authorized the purchase of Volare on the condi-
tion that Alitalia give up two pairs of domestic slots from Linate on the Linate-Bari and
Linate-Lamezia Terine routes that are flown by Volare. The ICA took into consideration
the characteristics of the Milan airport, where congestion and regulation impede the entry
of new operators and heavily condition the activities of those already present, and where
Volare now has twelve pairs of slots.
Following a referral from the European Commission, in September 2006, the ICA
launched an investigation into Assicurazioni Generali's acquisition of sole control over
Toro Assicurazioni.'' 0 According to the ICA, the transaction, which will create the largest
non-life insurance operator in Italy, could significantly reduce competition in various gen-
eral insurance segments, particularly in light of the significant overlapping market shares
of the companies. The ICA is bound to adopt a final decision in this case by December 1,
2006.
XIV. Developments in Japan
A. CARTEIICRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
January 2006 marked the effective date of Japan's new immunity and leniency program,
which was enacted as part of the significant 2005 amendments to Japan's Act Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the Antimonopoly
Law or AML). I1 The first reported application occurred early this year, with three major
Japanese industrial companies-Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; Ishikawajima Harima Heavy
Industries, Co., Ltd.; and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.-ultimately receiving 100 per-
cent, 30 percent, and 30 percent reductions in fines, respectively, in connection with an
investigation into bid-rigging concerning tunnel ventilation construction. 1 2 The Japan
Fair Trade Commission FTC) has touted the success of the leniency program, stating
that, as of September 2006, some fifty to sixty companies have applied for leniency under
108. ICA Bulletin No. 5/2006, Decision No. 15174, in case A358, Eni-Trans Tunisian Pipeline.
109. ICA Bulletin No. 26/2006, Decision No. 15666, in case C7667, Alitlial Volare.
110. ICA Bulletin No. 35-36/2006, Decision No. 15911, in case C7951, Assicarazioni Generali/Tro
Assicnrazioni.
111. See Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54
of 1947, amended by Act No. 35 of 2005.
112. Decision of the Fair Trade Commission, Sept. 8, 2006, available at hnp://www.jftc.go.jp/gennei
kouhyou.htuil.
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the new program. 1 3 This has quieted criticism that Japan's leniency program would not
work effectively, due to the cultural desire among Japanese companies to maintain
harmony.
The JFTC also used its newly authorized criminal powers under the amended AML
during 2006. In May and June 2006, the newly established Criminal Investigation De-
partment (hansoku shinsa-bu) of the JFTC filed its first criminal accusations against eleven
companies and eleven individuals alleged to have engaged in prearranged biddings for
certain waste disposal facility construction projects." 4
B. AMENDED HEARING PROCEDURES
The JFTC has claimed that its new hearing procedures, which became effective in Janu-
ary 2006, have been successful in reducing the period of time from when an investigation
begins to when an order is issued by approximately 50 percent, to an average of between
eight and nine months. 11 Under the new system, the JFTC gives the accused enterprise
prior notice and an opportunity to rebut charges of illegal conduct (although not in an
administrative hearing at this stage) before issuing simultaneous remedial and fining or-
ders. This is unlike the prior recommendation system in which the JFTC issued a cease
and desist recommendation to an accused violator without any formal prior notice. How-
ever, there is still strong opposition to the new system, particularly from the legal and
business sectors.16 Opponents claim that the new system fails to provide due process
because the system of prior notice and opportunity to rebut the charges is overly simplis-
tic, and the examiners, who are members of the JFTC, lack neutrality.
C. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
While in 2005 the JFTC withheld approval for two major transactions," 7 generating
speculation of an emerging trend of tighter merger control for Japan, this trend did not
continue in 2006. In a recent case demonstrating a less rigid stance, the JFTC provided
informal approval for a merger involving a combined Japanese market share of 45 percent
for certain products in the Sankyo/Daiichi Pharmaceutical case, citing potential pressure
from overseas companies as well as the bargaining power of purchasers." 8
With respect to market share analysis, there is evidence that the JFI7C is gradually
accepting the policy of considering the worldwide market, rather than focusing on the
Japanese market, in relevant situations. Thus, the JFTC permitted the merger of Sony's
113. Press Release, Japan, Fair Trade Commission, Processing Status of the Antimonopoly Act Enforcement
in FY2005 (May 31, 2006), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/teirei/kaikenkiroku06O9l3.htnl.
114. Press Release, Japan, Fair Trade Commission, The JFTC Filed Additional Criminal Accusations
Against [Eleven] Individuals Concerning the Bid-Riggings in the Human Waste Disposal Facilities Construc-
tion (June 12, 2006), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/2006/June/060612.pdf.
115. See Fair Trade Commission, Japan, Hearing Systems and Procedures of the Fair Trade Commission
(describing the amended hearing procedures by the JFTC), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/kaisei/kaisei03
.html and http://www.jftc.go.jp/teirei/kaikenkiroku060913.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
116. Much of the opposition has come from Nippon Kei Danren (The Japan Business Federation).
117. In particular, the JFTC withheld informal approval from both the Tokai Carbon/Mitsubishi Chemical
case and the Dai-Nippon Ink Chemicals/PS Japan case in their respective bids for business integrations.
118. Fair Trade Commission, Japan, Report on Major M&A Cases for the Fiscal Year 2005, Case No. 4,
June 7, 2006.
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and NEC's optical-disk drive businesses in a joint venture, clearly emphasizing the com-
bined global market share (approximately 35 percent for DVD±RW drive) rather than the
presumably more sizeable combined Japanese market share.'' 9
XV. Developments in Mexico
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
New amendments to the Federal Law on Economic Competition (FLEC) came into
effect on June 29, 2006.120 These amendments were initially crafted by the Federal Com-
petition Commission (FCC) and include significant changes in the area of merger review,
the FCC's administrative procedures, the introduction of a leniency policy, and the treat-
ment of monopolistic practices. Mostly, the amendments consolidate in the statute ex-
isting provisions included in the FLEC's implementing regulations, but they also include
new features, primarily with respect to merger review, fines and remedies.
In particular, the amendments grant the FCC the power to issue a ten-day standstill
order while a merger is awaiting a ruling in a compulsory pre-merger notification, mean-
ing that the parties cannot consummate the merger before the FCC rules on the case. In
addition, the monetary thresholds for mandatory notifications of mergers have been con-
siderably raised (from approximately US$53 million to approximately US$80 million).
The amendments also clarify that mergers involving only foreign companies with no as-
sets in Mexico (foreign-to-foreign mergers) are exempted from notification.
The amendments significantly raise the fines for antitrust violations. The FLEC con-
tinues to provide for a maximum fine of up to 10 percent of the assets or yearly turnover
of the offender. A leniency mechanism has been set up, allowing for a reduction in fines
for the first whistleblower, as well as for later applicants who provide useful evidence. The
amendments provide for the divestiture of assets as a potential penalty for offenders who
are found liable for breaching the FLEC more than twice in the same relevant market.
The amendments introduce into the FLEC the concepts of predatory pricing, discounts
or incentives tied to exclusive dealing, cross-subsidies, price discrimination, and raising
rival's costs, and deem them to be "relative monopolistic practices" (rule of reason
offenses).
In addition, efficiency defenses have been consolidated into the FLEC for rule of reason
offenses. The amendments also provide for a new test of "no harm to competition" (no
significant price increases, no significant reduction in consumer choice, no important in-
hibition in innovation), which a defendant needs to prove to offset alleged anticompetitive
effects. Finally, the amendments include a provision whereby parties deciding upon a
concerted action and those who actually engage in the actual prohibited practice share
responsibility.
119. Fair Trade Commission, Japan, Report on Major M&A Cases for the Fiscal Year 2005,Case No. 8, June
7, 2006.
120. See Ley Federal de Competencia Economica [L.F.C.E.] (Competition Law] as amended, Diario Oficial
de law Federaci6n [DO.., June 28, 2006 (Mex.).
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B. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Based on press releases posted in the FCC website,121 the FCC has reviewed about 150
pre-merger notifications through November, 2006. Of these, the FCC imposed condi-
tions in one transaction (Televisa/ Televisi6n Internacional (TV"))122 and blocked one
transaction (Ferromex/Ferrosur). 123 In TelevisaflV, although the FCC cleared the ac-
quisition of TVI (a cable television company) by Televisa (the dominant broadcasting net-
work), the conditions it imposed effectively blocked the deal. The FCC defined the
relevant market as being the pay television and audio market in the Monterrey area. The
FCC considered that, practically, the only competitors in this market were Sky, Televisa's
subsidiary, and TVI. Thus, among the FCC conditions, Televisa had to divest its interests
in Sky in the Monterrey area, a step it would not take. The parties are likely to request a
judicial review of the FCC's decision.
In Ferromex/Ferrosur1 24 the FCC blocked the proposed merger between Ferromex,
the operator of the North Pacific Railroad System, and Ferrosur, which operates the
Southern Railroad System. The FCC considered, among other factors, that the transac-
tion would be regressive to competition in the industry, returning to an environment simi-
lar to the pre-privatization era. Further, the transaction would limit the access of Kansas
City Southern Mexico (KCSM), a competing railroad company, to several cities in the
Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific coast, as well as near the United States border. Thus, the
FCC concluded that the merger would harm customers and the competitive process. Fer-
romex and Ferrosur previously tried to merge in 2002, but the transaction was also
blocked. The parties may resort to judicial review.
XVI. Developments in New Zealand
A. MERGER Ac-rr xm
Continuing the trend of the previous two years, the Commerce Commission did not
receive any applications for authorization of mergers, although, it did receive twenty-one
applications for voluntary clearance. Of the twenty-one applications, sixteen were cleared,
two were withdrawn and three decisions were pending as of the end of November 2006.125
No clearance applications were declined during this period.
121. See Federal Competition Commission, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx (last visited on Oct. 30,
2006).
122. See id.
123. Press Release, Mexico, Federal Competition Commission, Niega CFC por segunda ocasi6n la fusi6n
Ferromex-Ferrosur (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.phpoption=com-content&
task=view&id=2778&Itemid=204.
124. Id.
125. This data reflects merger clearance activity during the period from October 31, 2005, to November 28,
2006. For full register of clearance applications received by the Commerce Commission, see Commerce
Commission, Public Registers, http://www.comcom.govt.nzlPublicRegisters/mergersacquisitions-clearances
.aspx.
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In Commerce Commission v. New Zealand Bus Ltd.,' 26 the Court elaborated on the effect
of a finding of association between an acquirer and the target when assessing the competi-
tive effects of a merger. The Court rejected the submission by New Zealand Bus Limited
(NZ Bus) that as a matter of law an acquisition between associated persons (which Section
47(3) of the Commerce Act defines as a relationship where one party "is able, whether
directly or indirectly, to exert a substantial degree of influence over the activities of the
other") 12 7 is an internal transfer with no effect on competition. The Court also rejected
the argument that a pre-existing association between two parties removes the need to
assess the competitive effects of a further acquisition.
In one other development, this year the Commission and the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission agreed upon a Cooperation Protocol for Merger Review, 12 8
which is designed to enhance cooperation between them when carrying out merger
reviews.
B. AUTHORIZATIONS OF ANTICOMPETITWVE CONDUCT
In November 2005, the Commission received (and granted) 129 its first application since
2003 for authorization of an anticompetitive practice. The New Zealand Rugby Football
Union applied for authorization to enter into and give effect to a salary cap arrangement
and player movement regulations. In June 2006, the Commission also took the novel step
of revoking an authorization that had previously been granted to three joint venture own-
ers and operators of the Pohokura gas field allowing them engage in a restrictive trade
practice.' 30
C. ENFORCEMENT Ac-rrvrrv
The Commission's focus on cartel behavior continued throughout 2006, as highlighted
by the decision in Koppers Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Limited' 31 Following the commence-
ment of an investigation last year, this decision represented the successful completion of
proceedings against various parties for cartel conduct in the wood preservative chemicals
industry as well as the imposition, via an agreed settlement, of the largest penalties for
cartel behavior under the Commerce Act to date. The NZ Bus decision (discussed above)
126. Commerce Comm'n v. NZ Bus Ltd., 12006] (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2006-485-585, Miller J),
available at http://jdo.justice. .govt.nz/jdo/GetJudgment/?judgmentlD=I 11434 http://jdo.justice.govt.nz/jdo/
GetJudgment/?judgmentID=I 11434.
127. Commerce Act 1986, 1986 S.N.Z. No. 5 (NZ).
128. Commerce Commission, New Zealand, Cooperation Protocol for Merger Review, available at http://
www.coimcoim.govt.nz/FTheCommission/InternationaAgreeiments/ContentFiles/Documents/494050- .pdf
(last visited Nov. 28 2006).
129. Commerce Commission, New Zealand, Decision 580: New Zealand Rugby Football Union Incorpo-
rated, June 2, 2006, available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz//PublicRegisters/ContentFiles/Documnents/Fi-
nalDetermination.pdf.
130. Commerce Commission, New Zealand, Decision 581: OMV New Zealand Limited, Shell Exploration
New Zealand Limited, Shell (Petroleum Mining) Company Limited, and Todd (Petroleum Mining Com-
pany) Limited, June 2, 2006, available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz//PublicRegisters/ContentFiles/Docu-
ments/Pohokura Final Determination, 02 June 2006.pdf.
131. Commerce Commission v. Koppers Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Ltd. [20061 (High Court, Auckland,
CIV 2005-404-2080, Apr. 6, 2006, Williams J).
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also marks the first time that the Commission has brought proceedings for a breach of the
merger control provisions and sought penalties for such a breach.
In May 2006, the Commission conducted its first investigation under the merger con-
trol provisions for noncompliance with a divestment undertaking.1 32 Although the inves-
tigation did not result in any further action being taken, it demonstrates that the
Commission is actively monitoring compliance and considers that any noncompliance
removes the benefit of the clearance in respect of the entire acquisition.
Finally, in August 2006, the Cease and Desist Commissioner issued a Cease and Desist
Order against Northport Limited after concluding that Northport, owner of the only port
in Whangarei (Port), had breached the Commerce Act by: (1) taking advantage of its
substantial power in the market for the provision of access to the Port for the substantial
purpose of restricting a competitor of Northport Services Limited (NSL) from competing
with NSL in the market for the provision of general cargo marshalling services to shippers
using the Port, and in the market for the provision of stevedoring services to shippers
using the Port; (2) granting an exclusive license for the provision of marshalling services to
NSL; and (3) refusing to grant a competitor access to the Port to deliver cargo for export
shipment except under certain conditions, all of which had the purpose and/or the likely
effect of substantially lessening competition in those markets. 133
XVII. Developments in Russia
On July 26, 2006, President Vladimir Putin signed into law Federal Law No. 135-FZ
On Protection of Competition (the New Competition Law). The New Competition Law
supersedes the Law of RSFSR No. 948-I On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic
Activity on the Commodities Markets, dated March 22, 1991, and Federal Law No. 117-
FZ On Protection of Competition on the Financial Services Market, dated June 23, 1999,
which applied to banks. The New Competition Law became effective on October 26,
2006. Any application filed with the Russian antimonopoly authorities (FAS) after that
date is to be considered under the new regime.
The New Competition Law has introduced changes to merger control, antitrust provi-
sions, state aid and public procurement matters. It also regulates anticompetitive behavior
and unfair competition by financial institutions, which were previously regulated by a sep-
arate law. The following is a brief overview of the major revisions.
132. Press Release, Commerce Commission, New Zealand, Commission Investigating Pemod Ricard's Ac-
quisition of Allied Domecq (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/MediaCentre/MediaRe-
leases/200506/commissioninvestigatingpernodricar.aspx; see also Press Release, Commerce Commission, New
Zealand, Commission Closes Investigation in to Pernod Ricard's Acquisition of Allied Domecq (June 30,
2006), available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/MediaCentre/MediaReleases/200506/commissionclosesinves-
tigationintop.aspx.
133. Neither the decision nor the order were publicly available at the time of publication. Press Release,
Commerce Commission, New Zealand, First Ever Cease and Desist Order Issued against Northport (Aug.
14, 2006), available at htp://www.comcom.govt.nz//MediaCentre/MediaReleases/200607/firsteverceaseand
desistorderissued.aspx.
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A. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The New Competition Law has codified provisions regarding the extra-territorial ap-
plication of antimonopoly legislation. In particular, it requires foreign companies to apply
to FAS for consent to transactions outside Russia if the transactions will lead to a redistri-
bution of rights to shares (interests in charter capital) in Russian commercial organiza-
tions, or rights in respect of such organizations.
B. RULES FOR COMMODITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 134
The law incorporates the regulation of financial institutions into the general anti-mo-
nopoly law. In so doing, the New Competition Law sets down separate rules and stan-
dards for identifying whether a financial organization has a dominant position in a
commodity market, and special criteria apply to determine whether transactions to which
financial organizations are parties subject to control by FAS. The New Competition Law
further provides that FAS is to consider cases concerning breaches of antimonopoly legis-
lation by banks and other financial organizations in conjunction with the Central Bank
and the Federal Financial Markets Service.
C. STATE AID
The New Competition Law makes it illegal for governmental agencies to grant selec-
tive privileges to companies operating in the market (a prohibition upon state aid). State
aid may only be given for purposes specified in the New Competition Law, and only after
FAS has given its consent. Permitted state assistance must not lead to the elimination or
preclusion of competition in the relevant market.
D. PERMISSIBLE AGREEMENTS AND CONCERTED ACTION
The New Competition Law has introduced rules regarding permissible agreements
and concerted action that are analogous to those in Article 81(3) of the European Com-
munity Treaty. These have been extended to specific cases of abuse of dominance, and
FAS can apply them in dealing with economic concentration. Also, vertical agreements
(which do not fall under the per se prohibition) can be declared in compliance with anti-
monopoly legislation under a de minimis rule (no party may have a market share of more
than 20 percent) or by using block exemptions that are to be issued by the Russian Federa-
tion Government.
E. COMMODITY MARKET DOMINANCE
Provisions regarding commodity market dominance have undergone substantial modifi-
cation. A company or several companies will be considered to have a dominant position in
a market if: (1) up to three companies have a combined market share of over 50 percent of
the relevant market, or up to five companies have a combined market share in excess of 70
percent; (2) market shares are stable and access for new competitors is limited; (3) there
134. A commodities market includes not only tangible good, but also services and works.
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are no substitutes for the product and demand is inflexible; and (4) companies' actions in
setting prices and other terms of trade for the product are transparent.
F. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The New Competition Law considerably lessens the burden for businesses imposed by
antimonopoly controls of mergers and acquisitions. Through 2004, FAS had considered
more than 13,000 pre-merger notifications each year. The 150-fold rise in 2005 of the
thresholds for transactions that are subject to merger control 135 did not lead to the sub-
stantial reduction in pre-merger notifications that FAS had originally planned. The New
Competition Law attempts to rationalize FAS's burden of pre-merger notifications by re-
moving pre-merger notification for transactions that would not affect competition (which
would also spare businesses from having to delay their transactions while FAS assesses
them). The FAS forecasts that the New Competition Law should result in a two- to
three-fold reduction in the number of notifications submitted to the agency each year.
The New Competition Law has entirely removed some types of transactions from the
ambit of FAS on the basis that they have no effect on competition. Furthermore, over-
sight of acquisitions of shares (interests in charter capital) in Russian economic companies
is now limited to the acquisition of more than 25 percent, 50 percent, or 75 percent of
shares in a joint stock company, or a blocking vote at the company's general meeting of
shareholders (or participants).
In relation to acquisitions of shares in economic companies, the New Competition Law
has introduced one further simplification: if shares are being acquired in a relatively small
company (with assets of no more than 150 million rubles, or US$5.6 million), such trans-
actions are not subject to control, no matter what the total assets or turnover of the parties
to the transaction are.
The New Competition Law introduces an additional turnover criterion, whereby a
transaction is subject to control by FAS if the aggregate worldwide turnover of the ac-
quirer and the target (and their respective groups) exceed 6 billion rubles (approximately
US$220 million). It is presumed that this will not lead to an appreciable rise in notifica-
tions, whilst allowing FAS to control transactions with shares (interests in charter capital)
in those of the largest companies that have few assets.
An important innovation in the New Competition Law is that it directly establishes the
main antimonopoly procedures-the rules for considering cases concerning breaches of
antimonopoly legislation and the rules for considering applications and notifications re-
garding transactions. This approach by the legislature guarantees the rights of interested
parties, makes the procedures more transparent and consolidates the practice of applying
the anti-monopoly procedures established by the New Competition Law (including
through the accumulation of relevant court experience).
135. Thirty million times the statutory minimum wage. This has been changed to an aggregate worldwide
value of the parties' (and their respective groups') assets of 3 billion rubles (approximately USSI 10 million) or
more, which equates to approximately the same amount.
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G. PENALTIES
The successful passage through the Russian parliament of a bill introducing more se-
vere penalties for breaching the antimonopoly legislation will have a direct bearing upon
how potent the New Competition Law will be. FAS's proposed fine (up to four percent of
the offending company's turnover) should be an effective means of enforcing the New
Competition Law.
XVIII. Developments in South Africa
A. MERGER AcTITviry
1. Cape Empowerment Trust/Sanlam Life Insurance/Sansino
In February 2006, the Competition Tribunal dismissed an application by Cape Empow-
erment Trust to restrain Sanlam from voting its preference shares in Sansino.' 36 Cape
alleged that by voting its preference shares (which were converted to voting shares in
2002), Sanlam would be implementing a merger with Sansino without a prior approval of
the Competition Authorities. However, the Tribunal held that Sanlam had already ac-
quired control of Sansino in March 1998, before the merger control provisions of th.e
Competition Act came into force. Thus, notification of the conversion of the shares was
not required.
2. Telkom Merge?- with BCX
In November 2006, the Competition Commission stated that the merger between
Telkom and Business Connexion (BCX) should be prohibited as it would be likely to
lessen substantially competition in the information technology sector and would have a
negative impact on the public interest. 37 Although the Commission had considered the
possibility of imposing structural and behavioral remedies, it found ultimately that these
would not have been able to restore effective competition if the merger went ahead.
B. ENFORCEMENT
1. Public Inquiry into Bank Charges
In April 2006, the Commission initiated a public inquiry under Section 21 of the Com-
petition Act 3 into bank charges.139 This is the first time the Commission has used its
authority under the Competition Act to conduct a public inquiry. The inquiry does not
136. Competition Tribunal, South Africa, Case No. 05/X/Jan06, available at http://wwvw.coniptrib.co.za/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
137. Competition Tribunal, South Africa, Case No. 5 lLMI/JunO6, available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/
%SCcomptrib%SCcomptribdocs%5C99%5C51LMJunO6%20ext.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
138. Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended, available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/compact.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006).
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preclude the Commission from recommending a formal investigation if the inquiry reveals
competition concerns. In fact, the Commission has suggested that a public inquiry might
be the most appropriate fact finding mechanism to form the basis for a formal investiga-
tion. The inquiry was initiated as a result of consumer complaints and a request by the
Department of Trade and Industry for the Commission to look into the banking sector.
Public hearings were conducted in November 2006 and will continue until January 2007.
2. The Commission/Motor Vehicle Manufacturers and Dealers14
In December 2005, the Commission instituted proceedings in the Tribunal against
BMW, Citroen, GM SA, Nissan, VW SA, Subaru, and DC SA for adjudication under
Section 50 of the Competition Act, as a result of their alleged price fixing, minimum resale
price maintenance and imposition of excessive charges on consumers for new model vehi-
cles since 1999.141 In the first quarter of 2006, the Tribunal ordered the motor vehicle
manufacturers to pay administrative penalties collectively amounting to 39.65 million rand
(approximately US$5.5 million) under settlements reached with the Commission.
C. ANrTICOMPETITVE CONDUCT
In January 2006, in Nedscbroefjohanesburg'Feamcor,142 the Tribunal held certain re-
straints in a business sale agreement to be an illegal division of the market under Section 4
of the Competition Act and granted an interim order restraining the parties from enforc-
ing the restraint of trade until a final determination in the case. Nedschroef had applied
to the Tribunal for interim relief from a restraint of trade which it had agreed to when it
purchased its automotive fastener business from Teamcor. Under the restraint, Ned-
schroef and Teamcor each agreed to manufacture only specific types of fasteners. Five
years later, Nedschroef wanted to produce additional fasteners in breach of the restraint
and instituted proceedings in the Tribunal to challenge the restraint. The Tribunal found
that Nedschroef had prima facie established a breach of Section 4(1) (which prohibits
restrictive horizontal practices by parties in a horizontal relationship) because the parties
in this case were competitors and had divided the market through the restrictive agree-
ment. The Tribunal held that the Competition Act does not require firms to be prior
competitors for there to be a violation of Section 4.
140. See Competition Tribunal South Africa Annual Report 2005/2006, at 27, http://www.comptrib.co.za/
Publications/Annual%20Report/Annual%2OReport%202005-6.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
141. The highest penalties were imposed on GMSA (US$1,664,835) DC SA (US$1,095,890).
142. Compensation Tribunal, Case No: 95/IR/OCT05, available at http//www.comptrib.co.za/comptrib/
comptribdocs/10/951ROct05.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
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XIX. Developments in South Korea
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
1. Amended Leniency Program for Voluntary Reporting of Cartels
In 2006, the Korea Fair Trade Commission amended its leniency program for cartels in
order to simplify leniency application procedures. 143 The amendment, which applies to
leniency applications filed on or after July 1, 2006, features three key elements:
(1) Applicants may now make oral applications for leniency, in contrast to the prior
system which required submission of applications in written format.
(2) The period during which an applicant may submit evidence after receiving a
"marker" from the Commission has been extended from the prior maximum of
twelve days. The period is now normally fifteen days, but an additional sixty days
may be granted in extenuating circumstances.
(3) Full leniency may now be available even after a third party has submitted relevant
evidence, unless the evidence submitted by the third party is deemed sufficient
standing alone to corroborate the cartel in question. Previously, a leniency appli-
cant could qualify only for a reduction in fines of up to 30 percent if a third party
had already submitted evidence sufficient to merit a monetary reward from the
Commission under its Monetary Reward Program.'"
2. Amended M&A Review Guidelines
Amended procedures enacted on July 19, 2006, create a simplified and expedited review
procedure for certain business combinations that are not likely to pose any significant
anticompetitive risk. 145 The amended guidelines create "Safe Harbor" classifications
based on market share of the relevant entities after the proposed business combination,
which encompass horizontal, conglomerate, and vertical business combinations that satisfy
certain criteria. 46 Under the amendment, if the resulting market share of the combined
143. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Amendment of Notification on Implementation Le-
niency Program (July 24, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
144. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, KFTC's Launch of Reward System for Investments
(Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
145. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Amendment of M&A Review Guidelines (July 24,
2006), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
146. Combination ofCompeting Companies: In horizontal business combinations characterized by the integra-
tion of competing companies, one of the following requirements must be satisfied to qualify for simplified
review: (1) after the business combination, the combined market share of the top three companies in the
relevant market is less than 50% and the market share of the combined company is less than 25%; or (2) after
the business combination, the combined market share of the merging companies ranks fourth or below,
provided that if the combined market share of the merging companies ranks fourth, it should account for less
than 75% of the third largest company's market share.
Vertical or Conglomerate Business Combinations: For vertical or conglomerate business combinations, one of the
following requirements must be satisfied to fall under the Safe Harbor classification: (1) the combined market
share of the top three companies in the area of business a combining company is engaged in is less than 50%
and the company's market share is less than 25% in that area of business, and similarly the combined market
share of the top three companies in the area of business the other combining company is engaged in is less
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entity falls below specified thresholds, the guidelines require the Commission to notify the
applicant of the outcome of its review within fifteen days after the filing. The Commis-
sion may extend the review period if there are any special considerations.
B. NOTEVORTHY SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a decision on March 24, 2006, the Supreme Court of Korea addressed the issue of
whether the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea applied to an improper
concerted action that occurred abroad and solely between foreign entities.' 47 The case is
noteworthy because it endorsed the principle of extraterritorial applications of Korean law
even though the alleged illegal action took place prior to the amendment that took effect
on April 1, 2005, which codified the extraterritorial application of the South Korean anti-
trust laws.148 The decision strengthens the ability of the Commission's enforcement arm
to reach foreign cartel cases for conduct occurring prior to April 1, 2005.
C. MICROSOIFt
In 2001 and 2004 respectively, RealNetworks and Daum Communications Corp. each
filed a complaint with the Commission against Microsoft for abusing its market dominant
position. In particular, RealNetworks and Daum Communications charged Microsoft
with illegally bundling its PC and server operating systems with separate applications such
as Windows Media Player, instant messenger programs and media server application pro-
grams. After more than four years of investigation and seven hearings in 2005, the Com-
mission found that the tying practices by Microsoft had restrained competition and that
these practices breached Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, which prohib-
its product tying. 149 The Commission fined Microsoft US$33 million, and as a result
Microsoft was required to un-bundle Windows Media Service from Windows Operating
System and produce and distribute two versions of the Windows PC operating system
(one version without Windows Media Player and instant messenger and another version
with Media Player Center and Messenger Center). Following the decision, Microsoft
filed for a preliminary injunction against the Commission. The Seoul High Court de-
cided in favor of the Commission in July 2006.15o
than 50% and that company's market share is also less than 25%; or (2) each of the merging companies ranks
fourth or below in their respective areas of business.
147. Supreme Court of Korea, Revocation of a Corrective Order 2004Dul 1275, 120061 KRSC 5 (Mar. 24,
2006). Summarized English version of the decision available at http://www.asianlii.org/kr/cases/KRSC/2006/
5.htnml.
148. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair TradeAct, Dec. 31, 1980, Law No. 3320, last amended by Law. No.
7315. Dec, 31, 2004, art. 202 (S. Korea), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng (follow "LAWS" hyperlink;
then follow "Statutes" hyperlink).
149. Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Findings of the Microsoft Case (Dec. 7, 2005),
available at htq://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/.
150. Seoul High Court Decision 2006Ah8l, July 4, 2006 (decision not available online).
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D. CARTEL ENFORCEIMEN-[
In May 2006, the Commission imposed a fine for the first time on mobile telephone
service providers for antitrust liability, 15 1 following last year's fine against Korea Telecom,
a fixed network telephone service provider. 52 The nation's three mobile telephone ser-
vice providers were fined a total of 1.78 billion South Korean won (approximately
US$1.88 million) for their participation in an improper concerted action. The unlawful
action involved an agreement by the companies to limit or discontinue their flat-rate mo-
bile phone services.
E. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
In September 2006, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of the shares of
Carrefour Korea by Eland Retail Co. and KDF Distribution Co. on the condition that the
merged company divest a total of three stores, each in three identified geographic regions,
within six months. 153 The conditional approval marks the first time the Commission has
fashioned a structural measure to counter the competition-restraining effect of a merger.
The decision is also noteworthy because the Commission analyzed the restraining effect
of the merger both at the national and the regional geographic levels. In another case, in
September 2006, the Commission ordered E-Mart to divest four to five stores in four
regions as a condition of acquiring Wal-Mart Korea. 15 4 E-Mart is one of the largest dis-
count retail stores in South Korea.
XX. Developments in Spain
A. LEGISLATIVE DIEVELOPMENI-S
On August 25, 2006, the Council of Ministers (Spanish Cabinet) presented to Parlia-
ment the long-awaited Antitrust Bill.55 The Bill, expected to become law in 2007, unifies
the Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia (SDC) and Tribunal de Defensa de la Com-
petencia (TDC) into a single body, the Comisi6n Nacional de Competencia (CNC) with
greater independence (although the Council of Ministers maintains the power to veto
mergers on public interest grounds). The individual exemption system is replaced by a
legal exception system that requires firms to self-assess the compliance of their agreements
and practices with antitrust rules. The Bill introduces a leniency program similar to EU
competition law. The Commercial Courts are given jurisdiction to hear competition-
related cases, and claims for damages are made easier by repealing the need to obtain a
151. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, 13 Mobile Providers Hit with Fines for Collusion
(May 19, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
152. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Corrective Orders and Surcharges Imposed on Cartel
Regarding Rates for Local Call Service and Internet Cafe Leased-Line Service (July 20, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
153. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, KFTC's Conditional Approval of Carrefour Korea's
Shares by Eland Retail Co. (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
154. FTC Decision released on Nov. 14, 2006, #2006-264. Korean-only version available at http://www.ftc
.go.kr/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
155. Ministerio De Economica Y Haciendo, Ley de Defensa de la Comnpetencia, available at http://docu-
mentacion.meh.es/doc/CO/Proyectos/Proyecto%20LDC% 2025-08-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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final administrative decision as a pre-condition for filing suit to seek liability and damages
for an infringement of the antitrust rules.
B. MERGER CONTROL
As of October 17, 2006, more than 119 transactions had been notified to the antitrust
authorities, reflecting a continued increase in the number of notified transactions com-
pared to previous years. 156 Of these transactions, only five were referred to a second-
phase, in-depth investigation, 157 and only one was prohibitediss
One of the most notable merger cases of the past year was the takeover battle for En-
desa (the main electricity company) between Endesa itself, Gas Natural (the incumbent
Spanish natural gas company), and E.ON (the German company). After several actions
filed before different authorities and courts, 159 the transaction is awaiting the final deci-
sions of both the Supreme Court of Spain and Commercial Court No. 3 of Madrid.160
The Telkfonica/lberbanda case was the only merger prohibited in 2006. In that case,
the antitrust authorities were concerned about the anticompetitive effects of ancillary re-
straints of the merger (restrictions directly related and necessary to concentration, such as
a non-compete obligation on the seller).161 After the prohibition decision, the parties
modified the ancillary agreements and Telef6nica re-notified the transaction, which was
cleared following a first-phase procedure in May 2006.162
156. See Servicio de Defensa de la Competicia, Expedientes de Control de Concentraciones, available at
http-//www.dgdc.meh.es/control concentra.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
157. See the following decisions of the Council of Ministers: October 20, 2006, Universal Music/Vale Music,
October 20, 2006, Abacocine/Cineboox September 29, 2006, Abertis Telecom/Retevisidn I; July 14, 2006 Trans-
mediterrdnea/Europa Fe?7ys/1Vajes Eurotras-, July 7, 2006, CofareslHefame; May 19, 2006, Miquel Alimentacid/
Puntocasb; February 2, 2006, Gas Natural/Endesa; January 27, 2006, Telefdnica/Iberbanda; January 27, 2006,
Union Radzo/Antena 3 Radio; January 13, 2006, Dinosol/Supermercado Meracentro. Each decision is available at
http://www.dgdc.meh.es/control-concentra.htm.
158. Acuerdo de Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], Jan. 27, 2006 (B.O.E., 3034, p. 7086), availa-
ble at http://www.dgdc.meh.es/Acuerdos%20Consejo%20Ministros/NO5090ACMWEB.pdf.
159. Endesa lodged an appeal before the Court of First Instance of the European Union against a Commis-
sion Decision declining Community jurisdiction over the transaction. The appeal was dismissed. See Com-
mission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of Nov. 15, 2005, Case No. COMP/M.
3996-Gas Natural/Endesa (C4468) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/addi-
tional data/m3986 en.pdf; Case T-417/05, Endesa, S.A. v. Comm'n, available at http://curia.europa.eu/
jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (input "T-417/05" in the "case number" field and submit query).
160. See STS (Tribunal Supremo] [Supreme Court], lo contencioso, Apr. 28, 2006, available at http://www
.poderjudicial.es/jurisprudencia/pdf/28079130012006204678.pdf. formato=pdf&K2 DocKey=
e:\Sentencias\20060914\280791 3 0 0 12 00 6 2O467 8 .xml@sent-supremo&query=%28%3CYESNO%3E
%2847%2F2006%3CIN%3Enumerorecurso%29%29; STSJ [Tribunal Superior de Justicial [regional high
court], Madrid, 3o contencioso, Mar. 17, 2006, available at http://-Aww.poderjudicial.es/jurisprudencia/pdf/28
079330032006100199.pdfformato=pdf&K2DocKey=e:\Sentencias\2006051 8 \ 28 079 3 30 0 3 20 06 100 199.xml
@sent__publi&query= %28%3CYESNO%3E%28523%2F2005%3CIN%3Enumerorecurso%29%29.
161. See Acuerdo de Consejo de Ministrus [Council of Minsters], Jan. 27, 2006 (B.O.E., 3034, p. 7086),
available at http://www.dgdc.meh.es/Acuerdos%20Consejo%20Ministros/NOSO90ACMWIEB.pdf.
162. See MINISTMRIO DE ECONOMIA Y HACIENDA, INFOPIE DEL SFRVICIA DE DFFENSA DE LA COM-
PETENCIA: N-06038 TI.LEFONICAIBERBANDA (2006), http://www.dgdc.meh.es/Informes%20SGCN06038
INFWVEB.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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C. CONDUCT CASES
As of October 17, 2006, the number of resolutions adopted in anticompetitive practices
cases continues to fall, with a total of sixty-eight resolutions having been made in 2006, as
compared with eighty-seven in 2005.
In the Distribuidores Cines case, the TDC imposed a fine of 2.4 million euros (approxi-
mately US$3.2 million) on major American film distributors.16 3 It found that between
1998/99 and 2004 the five major film distributors had coordinated their commercial poli-
cies and contracts with film exhibitors. The Spanish film distribution trade association,
FEDICINE, was also fined 900,000 euros (approximately US$1.2 million) for its involve-
ment in the creation of a joint database facilitating sensitive information exchange. In
another case, FIAB/Grandes Superficies,64 large retailers El Corte Inglks, Alcampo, and
Carrefour were each fined 75,000 euros (approximately US$100,000) for jointly requiring
their alcoholic drink suppliers to set up antitheft label systems on products more likely to
be stolen.
In the Planes Claros case, the Spanish Supreme Court annulled a decision of the TDC
which imposed a record fine on Telef6nica, S.A.165 While the TDC found that Telef6nica
had abused its dominant position in the voice telephony market by launching an advertis-
ing campaign aimed at jeopardizing a new entrant, Retevision, the Supreme Court held
that such conduct was a legitimate reaction to a new competitive environment and that .the
restrictive intention is not in itself unlawful, provided it is put into practice through legiti-
mate means.
XXI. Developments in Taiwan
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Fair Trade Law is Taiwan's primary legislation addressing antitrust issues, includ-
ing monopolistic conduct, combinations (mergers), and concerted actions. After a major
revision of the Fair Trade Law in 2002,166 which brought many aspects of the current
regime into place, 2006 has been largely a year of implementation and enforcement.
Since 2004, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has internally discussed and proposed a
few drafts of proposed partial amendments to the Fair Trade Law. In April 2006, the
FTC made available to the public another draft bill of proposed amendments to the Fair
Trade Law for comment.' 67 There are two key aspects worth noting: (1) a proposal to
remove market share as one of the criteria determining the thresholds for requiring
163. STDC [Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia], May 10, 2006 (No. 588/05), available at hnp://www
.tdcompetencia.es/html/resoluciones/2006/2097.htm.
164. STDC [Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencial, May 22, 2006 (No. 589/05), available at http://www
.tdcompetencia.es/html/resoluciones/2006/2103.htn.
165. Spanish Supreme Court judgment of June 20, 2006, appeal no. 9174/2003, annulling the TDC Resolu-
tion of Mar. 8, 2000, Case 456/99, Retevision/lhlefdnica. The TDC Resolution is available at http://www
.tdcompetencia.es/PDFs/resoluciones/2000/1410.pdf.
166. Fair Trade Act (promulgated Feb. 4, 1991, eff. Feb. 4, 1992), last amended Feb. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/English"'eb/20000101299901011508.htm.
167. Draft bill in Mandarin Chinese available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/talk/Detail.asp?TidelD=50&name=&
passed= (last visited on Nov. 3, 2006). Although made publicly available, this is still an agency internal study.
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merger filings; and (2) the introduction of a leniency policy and exemptions for certain
types of concerted actions modeled upon the U.S.-styled "Antitrust Safety Zone" and the
European-styled "Block Exemptions." This draft bill has not drawn a lot of public atten-
tion, and there is no known schedule as to when it might become legislation.
B. CONDUCT ENFORCEMENT
According to the FTC's announced statistics, as of the end of September 2006, the
FTC has rendered fifteen administrative decisions against anti-competitive conduct and
113 against unfair trading practices. 168 It is worth noting that the majority of the cases
against anticompetitive conduct related to concerted actions; far fewer were related to
monopolistic conduct or mergers.
During this period, the FTC rendered decisions in a total of ten cases against unautho-
rized concerted actions. One of the most noteworthy cases is the long-standing investiga-
tion of the two major Taiwanese petroleum companies for acting in concert in raising (and
lowering) the price of petroleum.169 In July 2005, after a few years of investigation, the
FTC rendered a decision and fined both China Petroleum and Formosa Petrochemical,
the two largest Taiwanese petroleum companies, for acting in concert in raising (and low-
ering) the price of petroleum by the same amounts and at the same time on more than
twenty occasions. Both companies brought administrative appeals challenging the FTC
decision.' 70 No decision on the appeals has been reached yet.
This past year, in a meeting held on March 30, 2006, the FTC commissioners resolved
that, although the two companies have not engaged in additional unauthorized concerted
action since the 2005 fine, the FTC would closely monitor subsequent price adjustments
and continue to warn the two companies of the FTC's position towards oligopoly and its
determination to enforce antitrust laws.' 7 1
C. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
The year 2006 has been a lively one for Taiwan in mergers and acquisitions compared
to recent years. Most of the largest announced mergers and acquisitions involve the do-
mestic cable and media industries. In 2006, the FTC reviewed a total of fifty-seven
merger filings, twenty-five of which were determined not prohibited, and the rest of
which either did not require application or remain undetermined due to incomplete appli-
cations. Two notable mergers approved by the FTC in 2006, both involving the cable
industry, are (1) Macquarie Media International's US$883 million acquisition of Taiwan
Broadband Communication Corp., one of the three largest cable systems providers in
Taiwan (March 2006),172 and (2) Carlyle's US$1.5 billion acquisition of a majority share-
168. FAIR TRAI," COMMISSION, CASLS RECEIViD: SiAnSTIcs (2006), http://www.fte.gov.tw/EnglishWeb/
20000101299912311138.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
169. FTC, Taiwan, Disposition No. 094079 (2005).
170. Exec. Yuan Admin. Appeal Case Nos. 0950080966, 0950080991.
171. FAIR TRADI COMIMISSION, MINUTES OI inIl 751sT COMMISSIONERS' MEETING (2006), http://www
.ftc.gov.tw/FTC.ADDS/upload/2005282/0950330_001_751%AC%F6%BF%FD%28%A4%BD%B3%F8
%29.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
172. Id.
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holding in Eastern Multimedia, the largest cable systems provider in Taiwan (June
2006).173
On July 6, 2006, the FTC announced its internal "Handling Principles for Combina-
tion Filing" aiming to provide clearer guidelines on the FTC's review standards in merger
cases. The key points of the new Handling Principles include: (1) dividing the handling
process into a simplified process and a general process, and specifying the types of combi-
nation to which a simplified process may apply; (2) providing additional definition on
"specific market" and calculating market share; (3) specifying factors to be considered in
assessing anticompetitive effects of both horizontal and vertical combinations, and the
review principles for diversified combination; and (4) specifying the factors to be consid-
ered in determining "benefit to the overall economy."
XXII. Developments in The United Kingdom
A. LEGIsLAIrE DE\rELOPMEN-I-S
In 2006, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (OFT) announced it will resume providing
informal advice concerning mergers, but in more limited circumstances for good faith
confidential transactions and for those transactions that are likely contenders for reference
to the Competition Commission. 74 The OFT also issued new guidelines setting forth
the circumstances in which the OFT will provide complainants and other third parties
with an opportunity to comment on its provisional findings before the conclusion of an
investigation.' 7 5 Further, the OFT developed a framework under which competition
cases will be prioritized in the future.176 For its part, the Competition Commission out-
lined how the Commission will use its discretion under Part 9 of the 2002 Enterprise Act
when considering the disclosure of specified information received during merger or mar-
ket inquiries to another body carrying out statutory functions, such as the OFT.77
B. CARTEIJCRIM INAL ENFORCEMENTF
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) brought criminal proceedings against nine individuals
and five companies alleging conspiracy to defraud the National Health Service in connec-
tion with the pricing and supply of warfarin- and penicillin-based antibiotics between Jan-
173. Id.
174. OiFFIcE oiF FAIR TRADING, 1N-IERisi ARRANGFEMIN-IS FOR INFORMAL AI)VICE AND PRI.-NoIiICA-
"IION CoN'rcAi s (2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/businessjleaflets/general/informal.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
175. OIicI.IE O1: FAIR TRADING, INVOLVINc, TiIIRD PARTIES IN COMPETITION Acni" INVISTIGATIONS
(2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/business-leaflets/ca98.guidelines/oft451resp.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2007).
176. OFIiciE Or FAIR TRADING, COMPETITIiN PRIORI'ISIATION FRAMEh'ORK (2006), available at http://
www.oft.gov.uk/shared..oft/pressrelease-artachmients/coinpcriteria.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
177. COMPITI'I)N COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE OF INIORMAI+ION BY TlE COMPETITION COMMISSION TO
Ot1- I ER PuB.LIc Au'r IORn i.S (2006), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep-pub/rules
_and_guide/pdf/ccl2.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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uary 1996 and December 2000.178 This is the first time in the United Kingdom that
companies have faced criminal charges with respect to cartel conduct.
The OFT imposed fines for price fixing and other cartel conduct in three decisions,
including stock check pads, 179 roofing contractors, Is( and double glazing.' 8' The OFT
also launched criminal and civil investigations into alleged price-fixing by British Airways
and Virgin Atlantic concerning fuel surcharges for long-haul passenger flights to and from
the United Kingdom. 182 The investigation has already resulted in the resignation of two
senior British Airways employees. 8 3 Finally, British executive Ian Norris continued his
legal battle against extradition to the United States on price-fixing charges in the carbon
industry by bringing an appeal in the High Court in October 2006.184 On January 25,
2007, two High Court judges rejected Norris' appeal.' 85 Norris is likely to seek an appeal
to the House of Lords.
C. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) dismissed Celesio's appeal of the OFT's deci-
sion not to refer the proposed merger between Boots Group plc and Alliance Unichem plc
to the Competition Commission. 186 This was the first time the CAT has upheld an OFT
decision not to refer a merger. Additionally, the Competition Commission provisionally
blocked a merger between the two largest clinical waste services firms in Great Britain.'8 7
This is the first time the Competition Commission has ordered companies under investi-
gation to unwind and cease any further integration.
178. See Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Fraud on the National Health Service/Appearance at Magis-
trates Court (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/news/prout/pr_466.asp?id=466.
179. Office of Fair Trading, Decision on price fixing and market sharing in stock check pads, Mar. 31, 2006
(No. CE/3861-04), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/ca98-public-register/decisions/stockcheckpads.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
180. Office of Fair Trading, Decision on collusive tendering for flat roof and car park surfacing contracts in
England and Scotland, Feb. 22, 2006 (No. CA98/01/2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/sharedoft/
ca98_public-register/decisions/flatroof.pdf.
181. Office of Fair Trading, Decision on agreement to fix prices and share the market for aluminum double
glazing spacer bars, June 28, 2006 (No. CA98/04/2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft-ca98-
public-register/decisions/spacerbars.pdf.
182. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Investigation into Alleged Price Coordination in Relation
to Long Haul Passenger Flights to and from the UK (June 22, 2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/
press/2006/airlines.
183. See Press Release, British Airways, Commercial Director Resigns (Oct. 9, 2006), available at http://www
.britishairways.com/travel/bapress/public/engb.
184. Richard Wachman, Britisb Boss Fighting US Extradition, THIE OBSERVER (London), Oct. 15, 2006, avail-
able at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/O,,1922992,00.hnnl.
185. Nikki Tait, Higb Court Upbolds Norris Extradition, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Jan. 25, 2007, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8bf56al8-acc7- 1 db-9318-0000779e2340,-i-rssPage=4e6l2cca-6707-1 Ida-
a650-0000779e2340.html.
186. Celesio AG v. Office of Fair Trading, [2006] CAT 9, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/docu-
ments/Jdgl059Celesio090506.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
187. See COMPET1T1ON COMMISSION, PROVISIONAL FINDINGS REPORT: AcQUISsrTON OF STERILE TECH-
NOLOGIES GROUP LTD. BY STERICYCLE IrTERNATIONAL LLC (2006), available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/stericycle/provisional-findings.htm; and http://www.competition-com-
mission.org.uk/rep-pub/reports/2006/519stericycle.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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D. MARKET STUmiEs AND INVESTIGATIONS
The OFT began market studies into internet shopping, t 88 the U.K. airports market,1s9
and payment protection insurance. 190 It also investigated the UK school uniform
market. 9 '
The OFT referred the U.K. retailers' supply of groceries to the Competition Commis-
sion. 9 2 The Competition Commission identified a lack of competition in the market for
Classified Directory Advertising Services and set out a remedies package to address its
findings. 193
By concluding its investigation into store cards, the Competition Commission com-
pleted its first market investigation under the Enterprise Act 2002.194 The Competition
Commission's final report confirmed an adverse effect on competition in the supply of
consumer credit through store cards and associated insurance in the United Kingdom.
E. CONDUCT CASES
For the first time, the OFT published details of a case where remedies were negotiated
after a statement of objections had already been issued to the parties involved."15 The case
concerned an agreement among fifty schools to exchange fee information. Each school
paid a nominal penalty of 10,000 British pounds (approximately US$20,000) and also
agreed to make an ex-gratia payment totaling 3 million British pounds (approximately
US$6 million) into an educational, charitable trust to benefit the pupils who attended the
schools during the academic years in issue.
In another case, the OFT used its power under Section 35 of the 1998 Competition
Act, for the first time, to issue an immediate stop order against a company alleged to be
infringing the competition rules. Recognizing that one of the affected parties, Spectron,
could be eliminated from the market before the OFT's investigation into the alleged in-
fringement could be completed, the OFT took interim measures preventing the London
Metal Exchange from extending its hours until the investigation was complete. 196
188. See Office of Fair Trading, Studies-internet shopping, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice-and_
resources/resource-base/market-studies/internet (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
189. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, UK AIRPORTS (2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice-and-
resources/resource base/market-studies/airports (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
190. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE: REPORT ON TIIE MARKET STUDY
AND PROPOSED DECISION TO -MAKI, A MARKFT IN-vEFsIGAIION REFERENCE (2006), available at http://www
.oft.gov.uk/sharedoft/reports/financial-products/oft869.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
191. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, SUPPLY OF SCHOOL UNIFORMs REVIEW: REPORT OF GFK NOP FIND-
INGS (2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/consumer-protection/oft865.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2007).
192. See Competition Commission, Groceries Market Inquiry, available at http://www.competition-commis-
sion.org.uk/inquiries/ref2OO6/grocery/index.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
193. See Competition Commission, Classified Directory Advertising Services Inquiry, available at http://
www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2005/classdirec/index.hn (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
194. COMPErrIION COMMISSION, STORE CARDS MARKE-r INvESTIGATION (2006), available at http://www
.competition-commission.org.uk/rep-pub/reports/2006/fulltext/finalreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
195. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Independent Schools Agree Settlement (May 19, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2006/88-06.htm.
196. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Intervenes to Prevent LME Squeezing Competition
(Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2006/39-06.htm.
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F. ANTITRUST COURT DECISIONS
There were a number of important antitrust judicial decisions in 2006. In particular:
" The House of Lords overruled a 2004 Court of Appeal decision that had been the
first U.K. case to award damages for breach of competition law in the "beer ties"
litigation. 1
97
" The Court of Appeal found in favor of the OFT in three linked cases relating to
price fixing in the toys and games market and in the supply of replica football
kits.19s
" Littlewoods, Argos, and JJB Sports face fines of 4.5 million British pounds (approx-
imately US$8.9 million), 15 million British pounds (approximately US$29.5 mil-
lion), and 6.7 million British pounds (approximately US$13.2 million),
respectively.
" The CAT set aside a decision of the OFT which held that members of the Master-
Card UK Member Forum Limited and other MasterCard licensees in the United
Kingdom had been party to a restrictive agreement concerning multilateral in-
terchange fees.1 99
" The first "follow-on" claim for damages under Section 47A of the Competition Act
of 1998 was made in the United Kingdom by Healthcare at Home (HH).200 HH's
damages claim arose from a decision of the OFT, upheld on appeal by the CAT,
that HH had been subject to an illegal margin squeeze that amounted to an abuse
of the dominant position held by its supplier, Genzyme. The case is currently
before the CAT.
XXIII. Developments in The United States
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC)20 1 continued its assessment of the
need for reform of the antitrust laws and procedures in areas including merger remedies,
merger enforcement, antitrust exemptions, and "New Economy" issues. The AMC plans
to submit its Final Report to Congress and the President, which will include recommen-
dations for legislative or administrative action, in April 2007.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department ofJustice (DOJ) conducted
a series of joint public hearings between June and December 2006 that explored how best
to identify and remedy single-firm anticompetitive exclusionary conduct under Section 2
197. Inntrepreneur Pub Co. (CPC) v. Crehan, 12006] UKHL 38 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at http:/
/www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld20506/ldjudgmt/jd06O7l9/crehan- 1 .htn (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
198. Argos Ltd. & Anor v. Office of Fair Trading, [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, available at http://www.bailii
.org/ew/cases/EVAWCA/Civ/2006/1318.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
199. MasterCard UK Members Forum Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading, [2006] CAT 14, available at http://
www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/Jdg105456MC100706.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
200. Healthcare at Home Ltd. v. Genzyme Ltd., 1060/5/7/06 (Competition App. Trib.), available at http://
www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/NoticelO60HHI 30406.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
201. The AMC was created in 2002 pursuant to the Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (2002).
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of the Sherman Act.202 The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 (effective March 9, 2006) explicitly added antitrust violations under the Sherman Act
as predicate offenses that can be investigated, by order of a federal district court, with the
use of wiretaps, bugs, or other electronic surveillance.203
B. CONDUCT CASES
In its October 2005 term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard three antitrust cases, each of
which resulted in reversals or the vacating of judgments in favor of private plaintiffs. In
Illinois Tool Workers, Inc. v. Independent Ink,204 the Court held that, because a patent does
not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee, in all cases involving a "tying
arrangement," the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying
product. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagber,20 5 the Court unanimously held that it is not per se illegal
for two companies, as part of a lawful, economically integrated joint venture, to set the
prices at which it sells the joint venture's product. The Court found that the two compa-
nies comprising the joint venture should be regarded as a single firm competing with
other sellers, and thus the joint venture's pricing policy was unilateral conduct not subject
to Section 1 scrutiny. In a third case, involving "secondary-line" price discrimination, the
Court ruled that a manufacturer cannot be held liable under the Robinson-Patman Act for
offering varying discounts to dealers with respect to bids on contracts as to which they
were not competitors. °6
The Supreme Court has heard argument on an appeal from a Second Circuit case to
consider the standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) for pleading hori-
zontal price-fixing claims subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.207 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that allegations of parallel conduct are sufficient to survive dismis-
sal, and plaintiffs are not required to plead "plus factors." The Supreme Court also
granted certiorari in the predatory purchasing case reported in the 2005 Year in Review. 20
Decisions in both cases are expected in 2007.
There were also a number of cases of note in the lower courts in 2006. In Kristian v.
Comcast Corp., the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the use of private arbitration
clauses to restrict the availability of class actions and to foreclose the possibility of plain-
tiffs recovering treble damages and attorneys' fees.209 In a predatory pricing case involv-
ing the airline industry, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the
district court and found that, based on the evidence in the summary judgment record
relating to airline fares on two geographic routes, a reasonable trier of fact could find
202. See generally Public Hearings: Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Hearings on Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act: Single-Firm Conduct as Related to Competition, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/sectiontwohearings (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
203. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1)(q) (West 2007).
204. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (vacating the decision of the Federal Circuit, which had held that a patent
created such a presumption of market power).
205. 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).
206. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco, GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
207. Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cit. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
208. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
209. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
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there was evidence to establish predatory pricing and other predatory conduct by North-
west Airlines in a narrowly-defined "leisure passenger airline market." 210 In Scbor v. Ab-
bott Laboratories, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "monopoly leveraging"-
the use of monopoly power in one market to improve a company's position in a related
market-did not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.211
Federal agencies also issued some noteworthy guidance in 2006. In August, the FTC
issued a decision in the area of standard setting, finding that Rambus, a developer and
licensor of computer memory technologies, deceived an industry-standard-making organ-
ization by not disclosing its intention to obtain patents involved in the proposed standard,
and as a result, monopolized several memory technology markets. The FTC concluded
that the company's failure to disclose its patent intentions distorted the standard-setting
process and constituted "exclusionary conduct" in violation of Sherman Act Section 2.212
In October 2006, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ issued a Business Review Letter stat-
ing that it has no present intention of challenging a standard-setting organization's pro-
posed policy that would require participants in a standard-setting process to disclose
patents that are essential to implementing a new standard. 2 13
C. CARTELJCRhmIINAL ENFORCEMENT
In 2006, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ continued to work in concert with antitrust
officials in other countries to prosecute international cartels aggressively 214 (for example,
the multi-jurisdictional investigation of the airline cargo industry, and a related investiga-
tion into surcharges the airlines have imposed for fuel, added security, and higher war-risk
insurance).215 Additionally, the Division's investigation into alleged price-fixing in the
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) market continued in 2006, resulting in signifi-
cant corporate fines and indictments.216 The Division is also currently investigating the
210. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005). On October 2, 2006, the
Supreme Court refused to allow Northwest to appeal the decision of the Sixth Circuit "out of time," as the
petition for review was untimely filed (five days late) by Northwest's counsel and had been removed from the
Court's docket.
211. Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006).
212. See In re Rambus, Inc., 2006 F.T.C. LEXIS 60 (Dkt. No. 9302), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf.
213. See Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Robert A. Skitol (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.pdf.
214. See generally Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions, Presentation Before
the National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2006), transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/214861 .pdf.
215. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Inquiry Looking into Airline Price-Fixing, N.Y. TMES, June 23, 2006, at C3;
Paul Meller, International Business: Big Airlines Raided in Cargo Price-Fixing Inquiry, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 15,
2006, at C9.
216. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Three Executives Indicted for their Roles in the DRAM Price-
Fixing & Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Oct. 18. 2006), available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press.re-
leasesl2006/219102.htm. In all, four companies and 16 individuals have been charged and fines totaling more
that $731 million have resulted from this ongoing investigation.
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static random access memory (SRAM) industry, and has served several subpoenas on com-
panies from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 2
17
One judicial decision of the past year shed new light on the Division's criminal enforce-
ment powers. In Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States,2 II the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court and held that the Division could criminally indict a company
previously granted conditional amnesty when the company allegedly had not yet discon-
tinued its participation in the alleged cartel at the time that it made its amnesty applica-
tion. This case marked the first time that a company had been ousted from the Division's
amnesty program.2 19 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in this case.
D. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
In the first application of the amended Tunney Act,220 a district judge in the District of
Columbia refused to approve the proposed consent decrees for the two completed merg-
ers of telecommunications companies AT&T/SBC and Verizon/MCI without additional
information.2 21 The Judge required that the parties and the Division produce evidence
that the consent decrees are in the public interest.
Subsequently, the Division declined to impose any conditions on AT&T's purchase of
BellSouth. 2 22 The Federal Communications Commission is currently reviewing the
merger, and a final decision is expected in early 2007.223 The Division also announced
that wireless technology developer Qualcomm Inc. has agreed to pay civil penalties of $1.8
million to resolve charges that it had violated the pre-merger waiting period requirements
of Section 7A of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in connection with its acquisition of Flarion
Technologies Inc. 224 In particular, the companies were said to have engaged in illegal
"gun-jumping," because the companies' merger agreement required Flarion to seek
217. See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Sony Discloses U.S. Antitrust Investigation Over Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2006, at C2 (noting that Sony is the fifth company to receive a subpoena as part of the Division's ongoing
SRAM investigation).
218. 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), rev'g 352 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2005). In September 2006, Stolt-
Nielsen S.A., two subsidiaries, and two former executives were indicted for participating in a conspiracy to
allocate customers, fix prices, and rig bids on contracts of affreightment in the parcel tanker shipping
industry.
219. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Indicted on Customer Allocation, Price Fixing,
and Bid Rigging Charges for its Role in an International Parcel Tanker Shipping Cartel (Sept. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2006/218199.htm.
220. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 (2006).
221. See United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 WL 2175337 (D.D.C. July 28, 2006); Stephen
Labaton, Quick Approval of Phone Deals Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at C9.
222. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Tomas 0. Barnett Regarding
the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T's Acquisition of Bellsouth: Investigation Concludes that Combina-
tion Would Not Reduce Competition (Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press.
releasesl2006/218904.htm.
223. See Public Notice, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Application for Consent to Transfer of Control Filed by
AT&T Inc. and Bellsouth Corporation: Commission Seeks Comment on Proposals Submitted by AT&T Inc.
and Bellsouth Corporation (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DA-06-2035Al.pdf.
224. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Qualcomm and Flarion Charged with Illegal Premerger Coordina-
tion: Communications Technology Companies Required to Pay S1.8 Million Civil Penalty (Apr. 13, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2006/215617.htm.
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Qualcomm's consent prior to undertaking certain basic business activities, such as making
new proposals to customers and hiring new employees.225
The FTC approved a final consent order that largely dissolved a consummated merger
between Hologic Inc. and Fischer Imaging Corporation because of concerns that the
merger would eliminate competition in the production and sale of stereotactic breast bi-
opsy systems. 226 This was unusual both because Hologic's acquisition of Fischer's assets
was not reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and because the consent order dis-
solved a previously consummated merger.
225. Id.
226. See In re Hologic, Inc., 2006 F.T.C. LEXIS 45 (Dkt. No. C-4165), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0510263/0510263decisionandorderpubrecver.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
VOL. 41, NO. 2
